The power of neoconservatism by Kabalan, Hassan
LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
U.S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 2003-2008:
THE POWER OF NEOCONSERVATISM
By
HASSAN KABALAN
A thesis
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of
Masters of Arts in International Affairs
School of Arts and Sciences
November 2012
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research would not have been possible without the support of Professor Bassel Salloukh,
who continuously encouraged me, providing me with his valuable guidance and advices. There
are simply no words to thank him. Many thanks also go to the committee members of this thesis,
namely Dr. Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss and Dr. Sami Baroudi, who, despite their hectic schedules,
generously agreed to be part of the Committee. Last but not least, a very big thank you to my
family and friends who were indeed the best support team anyone can ever have.
viii
viii
U.S POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 2003-2008:
THE POWER OF NEOCONSERVATISM
Hassan Kabalan
ABSTRACT
U.S. foreign policy under George W. Bush went from distancing itself from nation-building
efforts to embrace a full-scale nation-building adventure in Iraq. The “Bush Doctrine,”
developed by neoconservatives in the Bush administration, pushed for preemptive wars against
imminent threats, using its democracy agenda as a cover for other agendas and objective. This
thesis investigates US policy in the Middle East during Bush's presidency and the geopolitical
consequences it had on the region. To this end, it examines, among other factors, how the
neoconservatives’  ideology and commitment to Israel shaped America’s foreign policy
objectives toward Iraq and Lebanon. The thesis uses these two case studies to contrast the Bush
administration’s geopolitical objectives in the Middle East after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against
its democratization discourse.
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1- Situating the Thesis
America has long had strategic interests in the Middle East, which resulted in
significant political and military engagement in this crucial part of the world. The
Middle East’s location, its vast natural resources, different ethnicities, recurrent crises
and conflicts, and Israel’s place in this region has long attracted the attention of the US
government. American interests in the Middle East are twofold: a military presence to
secure strategic routes and the protection of Israel.
Under George W. Bush, America went from distancing itself from “nation-
building” to become, following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the most nation -
building supporter in the world (Sniegoski, 2008). Bush’s efforts, which were largely
focused on the Middle East, were, to a significant extent, unsuccessful. Bush had
worldwide international support when US troops attacked Afghanistan in October 2001.
However, the administration’s extension of the “war on terror” to justify the invasion of
Iraq in 2003 did not receive the same international recognition. Bush, who anticipated
the overthrow of the Baathist regime in Iraq as a crucial step in the democratization of
the Middle East, faced many obstacles during the eight years that he spent in the White
House.
2While he advocated democracy expansion in the Middle East in most of his
speeches, Bush supported authoritarian regimes in many MENA states. In this regard,
the administration’s foreign policy was described as hypocritical and its credibility was
lost. By 2006, as Iraq sunk  into sectarian violence,  Hezbollah gained tremendous
popular support following the summer 2006 war with Israel and Hamas achieved a
historical victory in the parliamentary elections in Gaza, the neocons’  democracy
promotion project was halt.
Understanding US policy in the Middle East requires using varying levels of
analysis. For instance, US policy for most of the pre-1990 period was mainly driven by
protecting oil supplies (Gause, 2010). The first major change in this policy was
symbolized by George W Bush’s war on terrorism, which required direct American
military presence in Iraq under the name of democracy and nation building (Leffler,
2011). Until 9/11, US policy was directed toward preserving the current geopolitical
conditions in the region in which American oil privileges were secured. After the 9/11
terrorist attacks, a new strategy that emphasized nation-building and political reforms
prevailed. Indeed, major consequences of the 9/11 attacks were focused on the Middle
East, especially the Persian Gulf region. Nevertheless, Explaining US foreign policy
under Bush is subject to a critical debate between neo-conservatism and advocates of
others schools of international relations, namely realism.
What were the objectives of the Bush administration's foreign policy in the
Middle East? This research aims to evaluate Washington's objectives in the Middle East
between 2003 and 2008. It investigates US policy in the Middle East under President
George W. Bush and the resulting geopolitical struggle. To this end, it examines, among
3other factors, how the neoconservatives’ ideology and commitment to Israel shaped
America’s foreign policy toward Iraq and Lebanon.
1.2- Research Questions
The main research question addressed in this thesis is the following: What were
the objectives of the Bush administration's foreign policy in the Middle East?
Additionally, a secondary question is raised: Was the alleged intention of spreading
democracy a real objective for the administration, or was this a cover for other hidden
goals? Answering these two questions would shed the light on an extremely important
period of the modern Middle East.
As stated earlier, during George W. Bush’s election campaign, his foreign policy
planning emphasized a reduction of US involvement in nation-building. Before 2001,
Bush never mentioned the need to spread democracy in the Middle East. Then came the
9/11 terrorist attacks, which resulted in a more confrontational foreign policy. For
instance, Bush did forsake his alleged realism and embraced the neocons’ revolutionary
foreign policy (Owens, 2009).
1.3- Methodology and Case Selection
The qualitative approach is used to explain the dynamics of American foreign
policy in the Middle East from 2003, which resemble the date of US invasion of Iraq,
till 2008, the date of Doha Accord. The thesis is based on two case studies, Iraq and
Lebanon, in order to examine how US policy in the Middle East used these two
countries to achieve its regional objectives, especially vis-à-vis Iran and Syria.
4There are different reasons for choosing Iraq and Lebanon as case studies to
explain Washington’s objectives in the Middle East. First, the decision to invade Iraq
had seismic effects in the Middle East. The Iraq War's reverberations in the region are
broad ranging, affecting relations between states, political and societal dynamics inside
states, the calculations of terrorists and paramilitaries, and shifts in public views of
American credibility (Wehrey, Kaye, Jessica, Martin, & Guffey, 2009). Additionally,
the 2003 invasion of Iraq led to the first direct geopolitical confrontation between Iran
and America. For the past three decades, Iran has been perceived as a direct threat to
American interests in the Persian  Gulf and this situation is  not likely to improve
anytime soon. Sustaining American forward-based forces in Iraq was thus perceived as
a crucial geopolitical advantage, given the continuous importance of the Persian Gulf
for the US. Moreover, the importance of the region’s energy resources, an increase in
US ambitions in the post-Cold war, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the alleged link
between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al Qaeda, led to a growing need for a sustained
US military presence in the Persian Gulf, namely in Iraq (Gause, 2010).
Lebanon, a smaller country than Iraq, with almost no natural resources at that
time, was also subject of U.S intervention. One could argue that the American policy
toward Lebanon was historically highly dependent on the U.S position with respect to
Syria, and recently, part of the geopolitical “chessboard”  with Iran (Ashkar&
Chomsky). Washington's backing of the pro-Western camp in Lebanon, known as the
March 14 coalition, was part of the efforts to put pressure on Syria and to balance
Tehran's quest for geopolitical primacy in the Middle East (Sniegoski, 2008). Thus,
Lebanon, a historical playground for regional and global rivals, was also an important
5aspect of U.S interventionism in the Middle East.
1.4- Map of the Thesis
This thesis is divided  into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the
research, and the second one examines the various explanations of US policy in the
Middle East under George W. Bush. The third and fourth chapters investigate American
foreign policy toward  Iraq and Lebanon. Finally, the fifth chapter summarizes the
previous chapters, answers the research question, and spells out the implications of this
research.
6CHAPTER TWO
US MIDDLE EASTERN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER
9/11
2.1- Introduction
The U.S invasion of Iraq was based on Baghdad’s alleged WMD and Saddam
Hussein’s presumed ties to Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. This made the Baath regime a
dangerous threat to the US and the world, one which needed an immediate intervention.
American policy-makers constantly declared that their objective was to overthrow
Saddam Hussein's regime because it was developing WMDs, harboring and supporting
terrorist groups and defying the humanitarian  demands of the United Nations.
Additional rationales for the war have also been advanced, such as the quest to reshape
the Middle East as part of the war on terror to prevent any support  for terrorist
organizations through the political transformation of the states that harbor them (Clark,
2003; Hirst, 2010).
So why elaborate more on the administration’s decision making process after
9/11? The main reason is that the Bush administration was accused of fabricating false
evidence regarding the reasons for invading Iraq, even though supporters of the war
deny such accusations and constantly claim that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein
was real. In fact, there has been a strong suspicion that the Bush administration used
9/11 as a pretext to lay out a pre-existing war plan in the region, namely toward Iraq
7(Ashkar& Chomsky, 2007). This argument is also defended by retired General Wesley
Clark and former secretary of the Secretary Paul O’Neill (Clark, 2003). For many, the
decision to invade Iraq was part of a bigger strategy of U.S imperialism in the Middle
East, mainly its quest to control oil and preserve Israel’s dominance and security in the
region (Sniegoski, 2008; Pelletiere, 2004; Klare, 2004). Certainly, failing to find any
WMDs, which was the initial rational for the war, did nothing but prove that this war
was about something else. When criticism of the Iraq invasion increased, Bush’s
supporters dismissed such accusations, labeling their advocates as "conspiracy
theorists" and insisting that Bush decided in favor of the invasion out of concern about
Saddam’s WMD and his regime’s links to al-Qaeda. Not surprisingly, the fact that Iraq
contained one of the world’s largest oil reserves was left out of the administration’s
rational for war. This chapter examines the various competing hypotheses that explain
U.S foreign policy in the Middle East under George W. Bush. In particular, the debate
about the 2003 Iraq invasion between realism and neo-conservatism was heated. The
next section lays out the neo-conservative strategy later challenged by realism.
2.2- Neoconservative Views
Before 9/11, Bush had clearly  distanced himself from the neoconservative
school of thought, which repeatedly lobbied the Clinton administration to engage in
nation-building in the Middle East. As stated in the previous chapter, the 9/11 attacks
caused a major shift in Bush’s foreign policy in the Middle East. Rationales such as
Iraq’s WMD programs, Saddam Hussein’s ties to al Qaeda and his alleged role in the
89/11 attacks and efforts to initiate political reforms in this part of the world, were
employed to explain Washington's Middle Eastern policy shift.
2.2.1- Iraq’s WMD and its Ties to al Qaeda
One of the most important  rationales for the war advanced by  the US
government was that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed weapons that constituted a
direct threat to America and its allies all over the world (Gause, 2010). This argument
was essential and was understood to be the most significant American justification for
invading Iraq, which sheds light on the danger posed by Iraq’s development of such
weapons. The administration based its decision on the allegations that Saddam was
trying to develop fatal weapons, including nuclear ones. Hence, the critical need to
prevent him from gaining such capabilities  (Woodward, 2007). Even though those
allegations were never based on strong evidence, Bush and his closest advisors firmly
believed in them despite internal and international opposition (Gause, 2010). Gause
argues that Bush’s decision to attack Iraq stemmed significantly from his pre-existing
beliefs about Saddam’s ambitions and regional objectives, which would not be attained
without developing highly developed weapons. The nuclear threat posed by Iraq was
overestimated and was part of personal beliefs shared by many leaders of the
administration and not supported by strong evidence.
In addition to claims about Baghdad’s development of weapons of mass
destruction, another rational for the war was the alleged link between Iraq and terrorist
groups, namely al Qaeda. The Bush Administration’s decision to invade Iraq was seen
as a crucial part of their new “war on terrorism” plans. In explaining the relationship
9between Iraq and al Qaeda, Washington’s main focus was about the alleged  ties
between Saddam Hussein and Abu Moussab al-Zarqawi, whom Colin Powell described
as the collaborator of Bin Laden (Woodward, 2007). However, arguments of such link
were rejected by many American intelligence bureaus, including the CIA (Gardner,
2009). Nevertheless, Dick Cheney and other prominent American leaders insisted that a
tie did exist between al Qaeda and Saddam. Again, the lack of evidence linking Iraq and
al-Qaeda meant that there had been no evidence of Baghdad’s involvement in the 9/11
attacks (Gause, 2010). As in the case of WMDs, Gause argues that American leaders
were mainly motivated by their psychological bias while dealing with this issue.
America’s decision to condemn Baghdad resulted significantly from a pre-existing
belief about Saddam’s ambitions and regional objectives.
2.2.2- Democratization of the Middle East
Neoconservatives strongly advocated the notion that US foreign policy should
seek to spread democracy in the world, especially in the Middle East. Charles
Krauthammer argues that the promotion of democracy should become the cornerstone
of US foreign policy (Krauthammer, 1990). By committing themselves to promoting
democracy globally, the neocons pictured themselves as "the heirs of Wilsonian
liberalism" (Williams & Schmidt, 2007). Hence, invading Baghdad was perceived as
the first step in the democratization of the entire Middle East. Washington concluded
that democracy was the solution for all problems in the Arab world, namely terrorism.
One of the main rationales for the Iraq war was that by overthrowing Saddam Hussein,
democracy would be promoted in Iraq and the whole Middle East. Following the 9/11
10
10
attacks, many  U.S officials addressed the issue of the absence of US democracy
planning in the Middle East. They signaled the need for democratic institutions as
means to fight terrorism and promote stability in this part of the world (Rice, 2011;
Sharansky & Dermer, 2004). Most notably, Bush shifted from his initial non-
interventionism and adopted a confrontational foreign policy.  This shift advocated
global intervention and underlined the need for democratic openings in the Middle East
in order to undermine terrorism. Also, Bush claimed that America would act unilaterally
without the consent of other international players or the UN when it came to US
security interests, which represented a retreat from past American policies (Pelletiere,
2004). Hence, Washington adopted a new diplomatic approach that underlined the need
for political reform in the Middle East, and the invasion of Iraq initiated the
administration's new Middle Eastern plans (Ignatius, 2008).
Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer (2004) argue that replacing authoritarian
regimes in the Middle East with democratic ones is a crucial step in ensuring the
region's stability. In their book The Case for Democracy, the authors contend that the
use of military power to spread democracy in the region is morally legitimate and
strategically sound and would spread freedom and human rights in the Arab countries.
Jonathan Monten also underscores the importance of  democracy promotion in the
Middle East (2005). The democratization project was vital for America’s grand strategy
of economic and political expansion globally.
2.3- Neo-Conservatives versus Realism
As a response to the administration's explanation of the 2003 Iraq invasion,
11
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a number of realists argued that it was unwise for Washington to go to war against
Baghdad. They foresaw a set of problems and obstacles that would eventually
accompany America's occupation of Iraq and found it extremely counterproductive to
invade the country (Starobin, 2006).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Bush went from distancing America from
“nation-building” to become, following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, a fierce
promoter of nation-building (Sniegoski, 2008). Many intellectuals argue that the
administration’s policy in the wake of the attacks can only be explained by its ambitious
hegemonic (Jervis, 2003; Sniegoski, 2008; Ashkar &Chomsky, 2007). For instance,
Michael Klare claims that to safely extract oil and in order to ensure the preservation of
US hegemony in the Persian Gulf, the US had to develop a plan, months before 9/11,
which put the removal of Saddam Hussein and the need for a military presence in Iraq
as a top priority for the Bush administration (2004). Klare contends that the use of
military force by senior American policymakers was a US tool to ensure the control of
foreign oil resources. The author insists that every US president had never been hesitant
to use force when protecting American oil interests in the region against any imminent
threat. This assumption was a critical factor in the administration’s decision in March
2003 to invade Iraq (Klare, 2005).
Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Ashkar suggest that the cornerstone of American
foreign policy in the Middle East is controlling access to oil. They argue that if the
Middle East did not contain large oil reserves, the US would not have interfered much
in the region. Hence, preserving the existing regimes that would help maintaining this
status quo is critical to Americans global hegemonic plan (Ashkar& Chomsky, 2007).
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Fareed Zakaria made a similar argument.  He suggests that under the pretext of
exporting democracy, US foreign policy in the Middle East is imperial rather than
strategic (Zakaria, 2009). Eventually, Bush’s foreign policy was criticized because it
was seeking to control the region’s energy resources. The famous slogan "no blood for
oil" became a famous protest cry well before 2003 Iraq invasion.
Gregory Gause concedes that oil is a vital factor in the geopolitics of the Middle
East, but he argues that it was neither a sufficient nor a direct cause for the 2003 US
invasion of Iraq (Gause, 2010). He contends that if America invaded Iraq to control its
oil, then it is very surprising that the US could not achieve this goal in the post-war
period. Likewise, Raymond Hinnebusch points out the importance of the existence of
oil in the Middle East, but he argues that this explanation is very limited since America
did not have to invade Iraq to acquire its oil supplies. In other words, oil cannot be the
sole rationale for the war (Hinnbebusch, 2007). Stephen Sniegoski also debates the
argument that oil was the cause of US war against Iraq. He contends that since major
US oil companies opposed the 2003 invasion, oil cannot be considered as a major factor
in explaining the US invasion of Iraq (Sniegoski, 2008).
For instance, Gause claims that there is no evidence which emphasize that the
9/11 attacks were used as a pretext to implement a pre-existing US plan. Prominent
neocons- such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Faith, Richard Armitage-
and many other members of the Bush administration who signed a Public letter in 1998
calling the Clinton administration to develop a military and political plan to topple
Saddam Hussein’s regime, were not the sole decision-takers in the Bush administration.
In other words, the neoconservatives were eager to push America toward invading Iraq
13
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and to overthrow the Baath regime in Baghdad, but there were other opposing voices in
the administration as well (Gause, 2010). Gause explains the shift in US policy by
emphasizing on the effects of the 9/11 attacks. He argues that the attacks changed the
administration’s view of the threats emerging from the Middle East. Even though he
questions and criticizes the decision to invade Iraq, Gause concedes that Bush and his
closest advisors did firmly believe in the danger posed by Saddam Hussein. For
Washington,  launching a preemptive war against a dangerous  threat was clearly
justified (Gause, 2010).
John Measheimer argues that the neocons believed that America was the most
powerful military power in the world. Most importantly, they relied on such power to
reshape the world in a way that suits their interests. In short, as military power was
preferred over diplomacy, the Bush doctrine endorsed "big-stick diplomacy"
(Mearsheimer, 2005). Since 2001, Washington was keen to break the prevailing status
quo in the Middle East. The Bush administration thought that by overthrowing the
regime in Baghdad, other Middle Eastern countries would soon surrender to US power.
In particular, regimes in Tehran and Damascus would willingly follow U.S demands
(Mearsheimer, 2005). Accordingly, Mearsheimer claims that the Bush doctrine
emphasized the significance of democracy as the most powerful ideology. The author
describes the Bush Doctrine as being “Wilsonianism with teeth”. The doctrine has an
idealist strand and a power strand: "Wilsonianism provides the idealism, an emphasis on
military power provides the teeth" (Mearsheimer, 2005).
In contrast to the neocons declarations that democracy is the most appealing and
powerful ideology in the world, many realists emphasized the importance of
14
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nationalism (Williams  & Schmidt, 2007). The Bush administration  discounted the
impact of nationalism and strongly believed that US troops would be welcomed as
liberators.   One could argue that the George H.W. Bush administration sensed the
dangers of occupying a country like Iraq and thus decided to end its forces' presence
once Kuwait was liberated. Additionally, Walt (2005) disagrees with the
neoconservative claim that, by invading Baghdad and overthrowing Saddam Hussein's
regime, other states would also be subject to political reform and align with
Washington. He argues that states do not bandwagon because it actually results in
conceding  power to an enemy. Likewise, Mearsheimer contends that rather than
choosing to surrender, states tend to balance against a common enemy as a way to
defend their interests against an emerging threat (Mearsheimer, 2005). Thus, for many
realists, containing a weak and toothless Iraq is a far more favorable alternative that
would allow Washington to concentrate its struggle on al Qaeda. The next section
examines the power of the Israeli lobby in shaping the Bush administration's policy in
the Middle East.
2.4- Israel and U.S Foreign Policy
Sniegoski argues that Bush's foreign policy was created by a group of
neoconservatives who viewed politics in the Middle East through the lenses of Israel’s
interests. The author does not claim that the neocons sought to advance Israel’s interest
at the expense of America, but they perceived advancing Israel’s interest in the Middle
East as vital to US power and influence in the region (Sniegoski, 2008). In addition to
the neocons’ relations with the foreign policy makers in Israel, Sniegoski presents a set
15
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of documents proving that the administration was mainly concerned with the
advancement  of Israel’s interest. He assembles a set of evidence to explain his
argument, beginning with a 1982 article by ex-Israeli government advisor Oded Yinon
that advocates the fragmentation the Middle East, especially countries such as Lebanon
and Iraq. Yinon considers this vital to achieve Israel’s long term security. Thus, in
accordance with an old Israeli objective, many intellectuals argue that Washington
pursued a strategy of divide and rule in Iraq in order to fragment the country on ethnic
and religious lines (Ashkar& Chomsky, 2007; Pelletiere, 2004; Gardner, 2009).
Accordingly, Walt and Mearsheimer (2007) point out to the power of the Israeli
lobby in shaping US foreign policy. They describe the Israeli lobby in America as an
organization actively seeking to direct American foreign policy  toward achieving
Israel’s interests, consequently damaging both countries' national interests.
Washington's support for Israel was perceived as the cornerstone of American foreign
policy, which threatened American interests globally. In particular, the power of AIPAC
inside America was decisive in shaping Washington's strategy to reshape the Middle
East. The organization played an instrumental role in forging the decision to invade Iraq
and put pressure on Syria and Iran (Walt & Mearsheimer, 2007).
2.5- Critical Assessment
The Bush Doctrine, defined by Charles Krauthammer as a synonym of the
"neoconservative foreign policy", embraces the idea that America became the most
powerful state in the world and seeks to preserve  its hegemonic position for the
indefinite future (Williams & Schmidt, 2007). The rise of this doctrine was influenced
16
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by the increasing power of neoconservatives in shaping  US foreign policy. Neo-
conservatism revolved around the failure of Realpolitik under President Reagan to
contain US enemies, and that those enemies must be dealt with and destroyed pre-
emotively using America’s available resources and means before they could cause any
harm (Kaufman, 2007).
In analyzing Bush’s foreign policy, one cannot but notice different positions
within the administration regarding a number of foreign policy issues, especially the
2003 Iraq war (Gause, 2010; Woodward, 2007). Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld were clear
advocates of an aggressive military campaign against Saddam Hussein’s regime, while
Colin Powel disagreed with this view. Bush, the central and most important player of
the administration, did not initially advocate any military confrontation with Iraq. Then
came the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which resulted in a more confrontational foreign policy
by the administration. For instance, Bush forsake his alleged realism and embraced the
neocons’ revolutionary foreign policy (Owens, 2009). The importance of 9/11 is that it
caused a major shift in US foreign policy shift (Gause, 2010). The administration’s
policy in the wake of the attacks can only be explained by its quest to use 9/11 to
accomplish many geopolitical goals. It allowed the neocons to control the country’s
national policy and pushed toward confrontation with “rogue” states such as Iraq, Iran
and Syria.
This chapter focused on the ongoing debate regarding US foreign policy in the
Middle East under Bush. As seen in many sections in this chapter, the neoconservative
ideology was one of the most important  drivers behind the Bush administration's
aggressive foreign policy, which differed significantly from past administration’s
17
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policies. Certainly, this shift in foreign policy would not have occurred without the 9/11
terrorist attacks, which presented a vital opportunity for the neocons to advance their
own agenda in the region.
The fact that many of the administration’s initial allegations were not based on
strong evidence raised suspicions that Washington used 9/11 to lay out a pre-existing
war plan in the region. The objectives of US Middle Eastern policy under Bush were to
ensure the flow of oil and to reinforce America and Israel's security conditions and
hegemonic powers (Pelletiere, 2004; Ashkar & Chomsky, 2007).
The strategic importance of oil resources and its significance for American
policy makers cannot be questioned (Hinnbebusch, 2007; Gause, 2010). The principal
motive for U.S intervention in the Middle East is oil, which has always been at the core
of US interest since its early engagement in the region. Oil’s strategic importance was
definitely part of the decision making process during the past 60 years of US
intervention in the Middle East (Cohen, 2009). In fact, many of the administration’s
leaders repeatedly stressed the importance of Middle East’s oil, including the president
himself (Pelletiere, 2004). Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and many
other prominent neoconservatives were among the signatories of the 1998 PNAC letter
to President Bill Clinton, which stressed the importance of oil as a strategic objective
for US foreign policy in the region. Not surprisingly, 11 of the 18 persons who signed
the letter became part of President Bush’s administration (Sniegoski, 2008).
The importance of oil does not rest solely in its economic benefits. Besides its
economic benefits, and considering the nature of oil, there is a strategic value for oil in
achieving American global supremacy. For instance, this policy is significant for two
18
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reasons. First, controlling Middle Eastern oil would manage US allies’ access to oil,
hence increasing these countries’ dependency on America as  a source for energy.
Second, this would eventually lead to the dependency of its rivals, such as China and
Russia (Ashkar&Chomsky, 2007). Accordingly, the Bush administration,  like past
administrations, acknowledged the importance of the Middle East as strategically
important in its quest for global supremacy.
Another important factor is Israel’s role in shaping Bush’s foreign policy. The
origins of the neocons foreign policy revolve around advancing Israeli interests, which
coincided with US interests in the region. For many intellectuals, the neoconservatives
were driven by their close correspondence with the Jewish state. The evidence cited for
the neoconservatives’ firm connection with Israel is overwhelming. One of the most
important features of the neoconservatives' ideology is the alignment of their foreign
policy with that of the Israeli Likud (Sniegoski, 2008; Pelletiere, 2010). In fact, the
neocons do not hide their support for Israel, as seen in the 1996 Clean Break manifesto.
The document advocates an aggressive U.S foreign policy and stress on the importance
of overthrowing Saddam Hussein in order to advance US and Israeli interests. Under the
neocons’ leadership, America shifted toward a new hard line on the Arab-Israeli
struggle, invaded Iraq, and aggressively targeted Iran and Syria, the remaining two
nations that could balance Israel’s military superiority in the Middle East. Thus, the
decision to invade Iraq and support the pro-Western camp in Lebanon was seen by
many as part of an old Israeli plan executed by the neocons, who were pursuing an
American foreign policy “through the lens of Israeli interests” (Sniegoski, 2008). This
entailed undermining and fragmentizing Israel’s enemies in the Middle East. Tel Aviv's
19
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objective was to preserve its military leverage and prevent the emergence of any
country that could destabilize the status quo (Walt &Mearsheimer, 2007; Sniegoski,
2008)
2.6- Conclusion
This chapter argued that after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration was
eager to strategically reshape the Middle East. By invading Iraq, the US was in a
strategic position to launch preemptive strikes on its enemies, especially Iran and Syria,
who are Israel’s biggest threats. Even if no military attacks would take place,
Washington could ensure a geopolitical advantage over these rogue states by
threatening them if they do not comply with American and Israeli demands. Thus, by
trying to eliminate the threats posed against Israel, the neocons were trying to shift the
traditional balance of power in the region, maybe permanently, in favor of Israel. The
US invasion of Iraq eliminated one of Washington’s deadliest enemies in the region and
secured a strangle hold over Israel’s main enemies in the Middle East: Iran and Syria.
The next chapter examines Iraq as a case study for US foreign policy in the Middle East.
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CHAPTERTHREE
IRAQ: A GEOPOLITICAL BATTLEGROUND
3.1- Introduction
U.S foreign policy shifted significantly after the 9/11 attacks. The decision to
invade Iraq and assumptions about the post-invasion period were debated within the
Bush administration. The bulk of the debate was related to America’s foreign policy in
the Middle East, mainly the decision to occupy Iraq, as well as US plans for the post-
war period: precisely how to stabilize a war torn Iraq.
Gregory Gause asserts that the most dangerous perceptions in the administration
concerned neither the regime’s ties to al-Qaeda nor its WMDs, but the vision of post-
war Iraq (Gause, 2010). As was the case with the rationales for invading Iraq, there was
also an extensive debate within the administration about how to stabilize Iraq and how
would a post-war Iraq, with its various ethnic and religious groups, look alike.
This chapter focuses on US foreign policy toward Iraq since 2003, and its major
consequences. It is divided into two parts. The first part examines US policies and
planning in Iraq during the post-war period, including how the Bush administration
planned to reshape Iraq as a model of democracy at the heart of the Middle East. The
second examines US geopolitical confrontations in Iraq and how other nations involved
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in this struggle, namely Israel, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia, perceived America’s
Middle Eastern plans.
After years of supporting authoritarian regimes, the Bush administration
signaled that democracy was the solution for all problems in the Middle East, especially
the rise of terrorism (Williams & Schmidt, 2007). One of the rationales for invading
Iraq rested on the claim that by overthrowing the Baath regime, democracy would
prevail in Baghdad. Iraq was meant to become a model of democratic transformation in
the Middle East. However, the fact that such political transformation in the Middle East
was at odds with those previously advertised by the administration exacerbated
criticism of neoconservative foreign policy.
3.2- US Plans for post-War Iraq
The Bush administration failed to plan effectively the post-war period in Iraq
(Gause, 2010; Pelletiere, 2010). During the build-up to the invasion, the liberation
policy and vision presented by the neocons assumed an unhindered abolishment of the
old Iraqi leadership, paving the way for the new political elite to swiftly inherit the
functioning ministries and security forces. The rise of insurgents and the transformation
of Iraq into the Mecca for many jihadists seemingly did not cross the neocons’ mind.
Moreover, the amount of troops needed to stabilize Iraq was very much under-estimated
in the Pentagon (Woodward, 2007; Pelletiere, 2010). The failure to introduce a strong
post-war strategy and the state of political deadlock after the invasion was catastrophic
for all parties involved in Iraq.
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Experts argue that President Bush and his closest circle of aids spent the bulk of
their efforts in planning how to defeat Saddam Hussein’s weak army while neglecting
the crucial need of rehabilitating and stabilizing the new Iraq (Pelletiere, 2010; Klare,
2004; Cohen, 2009).The neocons’ failure to effectively plan for the post-invasion period
is well documented. For example, Bob Woodward asserts that the different visions
between the Pentagon and the State of Department were clear (Woodward, 2007).
Donald Rumsfeld and his aides were accused of ignoring plenty of studies that carefully
discusses the level of U.S troops needed to stabilize a post-war Iraq, as well as other
documents that gave advice on how to ensure an effective rebuilding of the country
(Woodward, 2007; Rumsfeld, 2011; Rice, 2011). Many US officials did also
acknowledge the critical mistake of dismantling the Iraqi army, a decision that hindered
security conditions in Iraq, and led to the rise of anti-American sentiments among Iraqis
(Andrews, 2007). The results of this vision were catastrophic, as not only did the lack of
troops not stabilize the country’s long and dangerous borders, but also the number of
insurgents was always increasing.
The decision to maintain a low level of US troops could be attributed to Donald
Rumsfeld’s new concept of the reconfiguration of the American military (Woodward,
2007; Rumsfeld, 2011; Pelletiere, 2010). Rumsfeld underscored the need to benefit
from America’s technological capabilities to revolutionize warfare and declared that the
US military should benefit from its technological superiority to fight wars anywhere
from the air without deploying large ground troops (Gause, 2010; Woodward, 2007;
Pelletiere, 2010). During the buildup of the 2003 invasion, Rumsfeld played a crucial
role in lowering the number of US troops, constantly pressuring the military generals to
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reduce the level of US troops. In fact, Rumsfeld’s new strategic vision fitted well with
the neocons’ established plans, which assumed that the invasion would leave the Iraqi
state ministries and public organizations with minimum harm (Gause, 2010). This
assumption proved to be woefully untrue as it contradicted the advice of many
government agencies that predicted that the whole public order in the country will
collapse after the war, hence the vital need to deploy larger forces.
Moreover, the decision by Paul Bremer, the Head of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) to dissolve the Iraqi army was criticized and led to disastrous
consequences. The disbanding order was a clear sign of how the Bush administration
and the majority of Iraqi nationalists were having contradictory visions on how to
stabilize the country and ensure order after the end of the war. More importantly, this
was a sign that Washington’s intention was to destroy Iraq as a functioning state
(Pelletiere, 2010). The high number of looting and the rise of insurgency were clear
signs of how bad the decision to dissolve the Iraqi army was. Certainly, it is very
doubtful that this decision was solely taken by Paul Bremer without referring to his
powerful subordinates in Washington (Andrews, 2007).
In addition to criticizing the small and insufficient numbers of US military
troops in Iraq, the neocons’ plans for the post-war phase were ineffective (Gause, 2010).
America was woefully unprepared for the widespread chaos that followed the invasion,
in term of assuming that the Iraqis, deeply oppressed under Saddam, will not rise
against foreign troops. In fact, shortly after the war, Paul Wolfowitz, one of the most
important architects of the war, acknowledged that America’s initial beliefs about the
period and intensity of insurgency were badly underestimated
24
24
(Slevin & Priest, 2003). Such assumptions were also influenced by the neocons’ tight
association with the Israeli Likud, as many Israeli intelligence reports were extremely
positive, claiming that US troops will be welcomed as liberators rather than as an
invasive force (Pelletiere, 2010).
Soon after the invasion, many resistance groups and anti-US militias launched
attacks against Iraqi and American targets. This resulted in high numbers of casualties
as Iraq sunk into a state of chaos. Pelletiere argues that the Baathist leaders took lessons
from the first Gulf war and decided to change their military strategies on the battlefield
by applying an irregular warfare strategy (Pelletiere, 2010). Initially, attacks were
mainly launched against US and foreign targets and did cause havoc throughout the
country. Shortly afterwards, when foreigners were more protected or when they simply
fled out of the country, Iraq sunk into its most dangerous sectarian conflict as attacks
against fellow Iraqi civilians by Islamist Jihadist groups took place and resulted in
thousands of casualties.
Since 2003, insurgency and terrorist attacks in Iraq formed a new trend in
warfare history. Suicide bombings had already been employed as a tactic in other armed
conflicts, but never at the same frequency and brutality that hit Iraqis(Williams C. J.,
2012).For instance, many reports conducted by global organizations, such as Human
Rights Watch, referred to al Qaeda and its main allies, such as the Islamic State of Iraq,
as being directly responsible for most of the terrorist attacks that hit civilian targets in
Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 2005). These terrorist attacks that took place in mosques,
Husainiyas, and markets among other civilian targets threatened to destabilize not only
Iraq, but the whole Middle East (Hazleton, 2009).
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With its low level of troops on the ground, and the failure to effectively plan for
the post-invasion period, America failed to prevent such attacks, which did nothing but
aroused anti-American suspicion and behavior among most Iraqis. According to many
official reports, by June 2004, America’s casualties on the battlefield constituted a
minority (less than 10%) of the overall death tool with the Iraqis forming a majority of
90% of the losses (Pirnie & O’Connell, 2008). By intensifying their attacks against Iraqi
civilians, the insurgents were eager to reveal the fragility of the US-Iraqi security and
reconstruction plans, pressure and warn anyone willing to collaborate with the new Iraqi
state, and most importantly, carry out violent sectarian revenge against other
communities of the Iraqi population. Additionally, Iraq's neighbors, mainly Iran and
Syria, were keen to fuel the insurgency against as part of their geopolitical struggle with
America. While the neocons’ project of restoring Iraq as a functioning state proved to
be catastrophic, US investments in post-war Iraq, examined in the next section, were
also subjected to heavy criticism.
3.2.1-Investment in Post-2003 Iraq
Investment in Iraq was one of the most controversial subjects during the post-
invasion period, since many U.S corporations were accused of corruption with a total
absence of accountability (Juhasz, 2006).In fact, it was almost impossible to evaluate
the accomplishments of corporations operating in Iraq after March 2003. In addition to
economic reformation, various projects were planned to restore and develop Iraq’s
infrastructure, electricity, universities, houses and apartments, and transportation
systems. Much of these projects were funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
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Fund (IRRF), an organization established by the US congress and the CPA, as well as
aids generated by the Madrid Conference on Reconstruction attended by representatives
of over 22 countries (Pan 2003). For instance, while the American Congress provided
funds for the reconstruction projects, it also did pass new legislation to investigate the
use of these funds. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGR) was
created to supervise and audit the CPA’s operations.
Even though the SIGIR was responsible for regulating America’s spending on
the reconstruction phase in Iraq, corporations in Iraq were almost working under no
supervision. Antonia Juhasz contends that of the 13,578 projects funded by the Bush
administration, SIGIR assessed only 65 projects (2006). Hence, with the absence of
needed supervision, global companies were able to gain billions of dollars, something
that certainly raises a question about the real intentions of these corporations during the
reconstruction phase. Nevertheless, even with limited oversight performed by the SIGIR,
questions could be raised about US performance in the reconstruction phase. In one of
the reports exerted by SIGIR, it is possible to examine the inefficiency, if not the failure,
of America’s reconstruction of Iraq. For instance, regarding the electricity sector, less
than 50% of the overall planned projects were accomplished, while more than 21%
were not even launched by Spring 2006. Thus, on the national level, an oil-rich country
like Iraq was enjoying just eleven hours of electricity per day, while in Baghdad, the
capital and the heart of the country, the number was between four to eight hours per day.
Although the reconstruction efforts made partial progress, namely in the water
and sewage projects, many problems arose during the   implementation phase.
Drawbacks such as poor security conditions, the disbandment of the Baath party,
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prevalent corruption, the absence of coordination among different organizations dealing
with the reconstruction projects and the past totalitarian realities of the Iraqi society
hindered the overall reconstruction of the country. Indeed, a poor understanding of the
Iraqi society by the different international agencies did not improve the situation. For
instance,  the Bush administration was also criticized for its role in providing US
companies with much needed legal protection regardless of their performance. More
importantly, due to a controversial law  decreed by the CPA that provides foreign
contractors in Iraq protection from all Iraqi legal power, legal actions against U.S
contractors, who were believed to have stolen Iraqi assets, were not possible(Stockman,
2006). The next section examines investments in the oil sector.
3.2.2- Oil Plans
Pre-war critics had referred to oil as a major rationale for the US invasion of
Iraq. Although Collin Powell emphasized that oil was never considered a goal for
America during the build-up for the war, oil was at the heart of the struggle and one of
its major motivations (Klare, 2004). Iraqi oil has far more strategic value for the US.
Washington was keen to reduce dependency on the non-democratic oil producing
nations and undermine and pressure the oil-producers countries such as Saudi Arabia
and Iran to undergo economic and political reform in order to advance the neo-
conservative plans of global democratic expansion (Sykes, 2010). Indeed, oil was never
the only motive for the war, but many US officials had Iraqi oil clearly in their sight. In
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particular, US Vice President Dick Cheney highlighted the need to control Persian oil
supplies in one of his pre-war speeches. In addition to the purely economic benefits of
controlling Iraqi oil, the administration saw control over Persian Gulf energy resources
as crucial in balancing the ascending political role of its direct rivals, namely China and
Russia (Ashkar& Chomsky, 2006).
For instance, no-bid oil contracts were given to major US corporations, such as
Halliburton and Bechtel. Particularly, Halliburton, a US organization closely related to
then vice-president Cheney, did receive what is understood to be Iraqi favoritism to
rebuild the oil infrastructure in Iraq (Glanz, 2006). Iraq’s major oil contracts were given
to American corporations, such as Bechtel, a large contributor to the Republicans Party.
The appointment of Philipp Carroll, a former Shell CEO, as the head of the team
responsible for managing the Iraqi oil sector, was a clear sign of these corporations’
political power (Pelletiere, 2010). Indeed, by shielding them from any accountability
regarding their activities in Iraq, Bush gave these companies absolute legal protection
(Juhasz, 2006).
The Iraq oil Law, mentioned as the hydrocarbon law, is a US suggested law
proposed to the Iraqi parliament in 2007. Although the bill was written in 2004 by the
US government, it was approved by the Maliki government in February 2007, only to
be blocked by the Iraqi parliament as it created political tensions around the country.
The law was extremely unpopular among Iraqis, as it gives foreign companies 10 years
of exclusive development and exploration rights. Once the exploration deals expire,
these corporations have the right to negotiate new ones that consist of producing the oil
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for another 20 years, but this time through  partnering with the Iraq National Oil
Company (INOC). These foreign firms would only pay the Iraqi government 12.5%
allowance of the oil value, with an option of exporting whatever oil explored (Walt,
2007).
Such plans were not welcomed among Iraqis as many groups protested against
what they believed were excessively generous oil deals, which Iraq would eventually
regret after the war. Critics argued that this new law is unnecessary since Iraq’s oil is
among  the cheapest and easiest to extract. Others pointed to the fact that Iraq’s
refineries were not heavily damaged during the invasion, hence there would be no
serious need for its reconstruction (Fortson, 2009). Certainly, U.S oil companies were
trying to benefit from America’s military presence in Iraq to get no-bid contracts since
many other non-American corporations would provide the Iraqis with the same amount
of service at a lower cost.
Unsurprisingly, the privatization of the oil sector was part of the neo-cons post-
war of Iraq strategy. Pelletiere contends that in promoting the Iraq take-over, the pro-
Israel lobby in the administration was hoping to acquire a source of oil for Israel
(Pelletiere, 2010). According to many reports, shortly after the invasion, there were
plans to construct a new pipeline to pump oil from Northern Iraq to refineries in Haifa
(Vuillamy, 2003). By providing its regional ally with cheap oil resources, the Bush
administration was eager to solve Israel’s energy headache. Accordingly, Joe Vialls
argues that the war on Iraq was highly influenced by Israel’s energy needs. He claims
that the Iraq War was designed to provide Israel with large economic benefits from Iraqi
oil as well as eliminating Israel’s dependency on Russian’s energy sources(Vialls,
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2003). In other words, the war was fought on behalf of Israel in order to secure Tel
Aviv’s oil needs. The next section examines the neocons’ plans to create a new
democratic system in Iraq and their efforts to spread democracy throughout the Middle
East.
3.2.3- A New Middle East
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US administration was eager to launch a new
policy in the region, often referred to as the New Middle East, with the decision to
invade Iraq as the most important driver of this new approach (Williams & Schmidt,
2007). The neocons saw the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the creation of a free Iraq
at  the heart of the Middle East as  a landmark in reshaping the whole region. As
discussed in the preceding chapter, installing a democratic government in Iraq was the
first step to spread democracy to other countries in the Middle East. Bush (2010),
Cheney (2012) and Rice (2011) did stress the importance of overthrowing Saddam
Hussein as a first and vital step to promote democracy and bring peace to Iraq and they
claimed that this would soon expand to the greater states of the Middle Eastern. The
neocons were convinced that terrorism, which for them is the root of the problem in this
region, was due to the absence of democratic systems in most of the Middle Eastern
states (Dermer & Sharansky, 2004). Consequently, they held that direct and unilateral
military actions were totally justified. Washington held that its enemies were trying to
use terrorism as a war of ideology against America. Thus, the administration’s
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responsibility was to protect its citizens by trying to promote democracy as an opposing
ideology (Bush, 2010; Salomon, 2007).
As stated earlier in the chapter, the neocons' main objective was to plant
democracy in Iraq through military intervention in order to expand it throughout the
Arab world. Nevertheless, whether or not Iraqis accepted such a foreign imposition of
democracy is debatable. Even if Iraq and other countries were embracing democratic
norms such as elections and parliaments, they were not doing so for the sake of true
liberal democratic transformations (Wehrey et al., 2009). Moreover, even though the
dictatorial regime was ousted, Iraq fell into a destructive civil war that resulted in
hundred thousands of Iraqi casualties and enormous negative socioeconomic effects
(Carothers, 2007). Hopes of regional democratic expansions were halted by increasing
tensions in Iraq. Thomas Carothers argues that as the images of   hundreds of Arabs
dying as a result of a “democratic experiment” were spread all over the world, the Arab
leaders were able to use the war to reinforce their long-standing message to their
citizens about the perils of rapid democratic change in their region. The consequences
of the Iraq war were indeed felt all over the Middle East. The increasing number of
Iraqi refugees, the rise of terrorist organization and the alarming growth of the Shia–
Sunni conflict were used by Arab regimes to counter demands for domestic political
openings (Carothers, 2007).
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3.2.4- Critical assessment
In 2008, the Middle East was a very different region than that in the pre-9/11
period. The invasion of Iraq was crucial and vital in this transformation. However, the
transformations that took place were certainly not what the neocons had in mind.
Despite partial improvement in the country’s security conditions, Iraq continued to be
politically unstable and ethnically divided (Ashkar & Chomsky, 2007). Based on the
behavior of the Bush administration, it is believed that the neocons’ plan in Iraq was
neither to rebuild the country nor to rehabilitate it.
The American decision to invade and occupy Iraq increased sectarian tensions in
the country. This was in part a consequence of a US-Israeli plan to reshape the region
and fragment it into a set of ethnic states, itself an old Israeli plan to redraw the map of
the Middle East (Ashkar & Chomsky, 2007; Sniegoski, 2008). The 2003 invasion and
subsequent occupation of Iraq unleashed a destructive sectarian Sunni-Shia contest that
has reshaped the geopolitics of the region. Far from solving many of their enduring
problems, Iraqis will have, for decades to come, to live with the disastrous
consequences of the American invasion of their country and the geopolitical struggle
that was initiated. Indeed, the US failure to effectively rebuild Iraq was also caused by
the geopolitical struggles that took place in the country. The next section examines US
geopolitical struggles in Iraq, and its direct implications on the Middle East.
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3.3-The Geopolitical Struggle in Iraq
After the 2003 invasion, Iraq became a key pillar in the geopolitical struggle
between America and Iran. This struggle for power in the region was initially shaped by
the eight years long Iran-Iraq War, the first Gulf war in 1991, and finally by the
decision to invade Iraq in 2003. It is a long-lasting quest for geopolitical supremacy
created by Iraq’s unsettled politics as well as the social structure of Iraq and its
abundant oil resources. This geopolitical struggle was felt around the Middle East, but
Iraq was the eventual playground where most regional players were trying to claim
supremacy (Pelletiere, 2010; Gause, 2010). Regardless of the outcomes of the
geopolitical struggle initiated in 2003, the struggle in Iraq strategically shaped the
balance of power in the Middle East in for decades to come (Wehrey et al., 2009).
Frederic Wehrey, Dalia Kaye, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey Martin and Robert Guffey
(2009) argue that the Iraq War’s reverberations  in the region are broad ranging,
affecting relations between states, political and societal dynamics inside states, the
calculations of terrorists and paramilitaries, and shifts in public views of American
credibility. The Bush administration was long keen to establish a base in Iraq in order to
spread its dominance  throughout the Middle East (Sniegoski,  2008; Ashkar &
Chomsky, 2007; Pelletiere, 2010). Certainly, many of the actors involved in Iraq were
considered as major obstacles for America’s ambition in the region. This section
examines how the Iraq war initiated new regional dynamics in the Middle East. The
main struggle initiated by the war was the one between America and Iran, but other
countries were also involved, especially Syria and Saudi Arabia. Israel, a longtime
backer of the war, was also an important figure in this struggle. The overthrow of the
34
34
Baath regime in Baghdad disturbed the longstanding balance of power in the region,
which shifted toward Iran (Wehrey et al., 2009). Wehrey et al. (2009) contend that the
perceived removal of the Iraqi buffer to Iran following the Iraq War led to widespread
concern among Arab states that Iran can more easily maneuver in the core of the Middle
East, from Lebanon to Gaza. The new conditions in Iraq resulted in perceptions of an
increased vulnerability of the Arab Sunni regimes.
3.3.1- A War for Israel
Israeli plans to outset Saddam Hussein had been on place for years (Walt &
Mearsheimer, 2007). In 1996, then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed
a grand strategy for Israel in the Middle East, which was entitled "A Clean Break: A
New Strategy for Securing the Realm" and written under the auspices of an Israeli think
tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (Weber, 2008). The
document recommends that America should focus its efforts on ousting Saddam
Hussein's, a vital objective for Israel. With support from Tel Aviv and the powerful
Israeli lobby in America, and largely influenced by the neocons in his administration,
Bush decided to invade Iraq and wipe out one of Israel's fiercest enemies (Walt &
Mearsheimer, 2007).
Israel’s geopolitical supremacy was among the most important rationales for the
Iraq invasion in 2003 (Pelletiere, 2010; Walt &Mearsheimer, 2007). Walt and
Mearsheimer (2007) argue that pressure from Tel Aviv and the Israeli lobby was the not
the sole factor behind Washington's decision to invade Iraq, yet it was a critical one.
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The authors contend that the decision to invade Iraq was driven by   the
neoconservatives' desire to make Israel more secure. Philip Zelikow, then executive
director of the body set up to investigate the 9/11 attacks, claims that Iraq Saddam
Hussein was not a threat to America, but he was to Israel, which is one reason why the
Bush administration decided to invade Iraq in 2003 (Mekay, 2004). Likewise, Robert
Novak asserts that Israel's security was one of the main rationales of the war.
For instance, the Iraq war perceived as the first step of a larger plan to reshape
the Middle East in ways that would enhance Israel's security and increase America's
geopolitical power. Walt and Mearsheimer (2007) claim that the driving force behind
the invasion was the neoconservatives who were keen to  strategically reshape the
Middle East. The Iraq war was meant to trigger democratic openings. Reshaping the
Middle East was meant to ensure that democratic  regimes, friendly to Israel and
America, would replace the old authoritarian governments. By installing US military
bases in Iraq, the threat posed by Tel Aviv’s enemies would be neutralized. Sniegoski
contends that the neocons in the Bush administration were eager to reshape the Middle
East in order to achieve a long term Israeli goal. Reshaping the region was central to the
neocons in order to weaken Israel's regional foes. For Israel, reshaping the Middle East
would enhance its security and preserve its regional hegemony (Sniegoski, 2008).
For instance, some experts claim that the decision to invade Iraq did not benefit
Israel. The main concern for Tel Aviv resulting from this war was related to the
growing role of Tehran (Wehrey et al., 2009). Wehrey et al . (2009) argue that Israel has
long been concerned about Iranian regional ambitions and hostility and subsequent
Israeli officials perceive Tehran as the most serious, even existential, threat. The rising
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power of Tehran after 2003 and the country's emerging nuclear crisis, coupled with the
provocative discourse of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, heightened Israeli
fears of a nuclear Iran. The post-war regional rise of Iran, coupled with its growing
support for anti-Israel organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, weakened Israel’s
geopolitical condition. The war increased hostility against Tel Aviv by most Arabs and
the ascendant role of pro-Iran organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas,
significantly damaged Israel’s security condition. After the war, Israel's geopolitical
condition was certainly weakened with the regional rise of Iran. Certainly, Tel Aviv’s
ambitions in post-war Iraq were sometimes balanced by the growing Iranian power. The
next section examines US geopolitical struggle with Iran and its implications.
3.3.2-Iran: the Emerging Threat
The traditional Middle East regional system since 1945 has been governed by
continuous engagement and struggle for primacy between Iran and numerous Arab
countries. To ensure that no power would prevail over the other, these regional powers
have long been backed by military assistance and political support from great powers,
such as America and the Soviet Union. The 2003 Iraq war caused a fundamental shift in
the regional balance of power toward non-Arab states, especially Iran (Wehrey et al.,
2009).  On the one hand, the outset of the Baath regime, long considered as the
balancing power to Iran's regional ambition, was exploited by Tehran. On the other
hand, the war increased Washington's leverage in the Persian Gulf as the genuine
regional power. Indeed, the Bush administration greater tried to benefit from its military
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presence in Iraq to counter Iran in its quest for regional supremacy. Ironically, the
decision to invade Iraq went to a large extent in Iran’s favor and not the opposite. The
war strengthened an Iranian-led axis running through Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
Iran emerged as a far more powerful player in the Middle East since the overthrow of
the Baathist regime in Baghdad and the total collapse of the Iraqi state (Pelletiere,
2010). Certainly, this situation was neither envisaged nor perceived by the main
architects of the invasion, who saw the war as a vital first step toward reshaping the
region, ultimately pushing toward the overthrow of the mullahs in Tehran as well.
Surprisingly for many, with the toppling of the Baathist regime in Baghdad, the balance
of power in the region has shifted in Iran’s favor, resulting in an increase in its influence
in the Persian Gulf and the Levant (Nasr, 2006; Pelletiere, 2010).
In the wake of the Iraq invasion, Tehran grew aggressive in its foreign policy
approach, characterized by  its nuclear ambitions and regional expansion. Various
studies since the war indicated that most of the Shia political factions in Iraq have long
standing ties to Tehran (Wehrey et al., 2009). Most of Iraq’s problems could not be
solved without coordinating with its Persian neighbor and it was nearly impossible to
come up with solutions in Iraq without referring back to Iran. The same can be said
regarding the political level, as both countries formed a cluster which only strengthens
Iran’s ascending  role in the region (Ottaway, Hamzawy, Brown, Sadjadpour, and
Salem, 2008). Faced with such new political circumstances, the Bush administration
decision making undermined America’s role compared to the Iranian one and a new
reality prevailed: America had to overcome a far more powerful Iran in its geopolitical
struggle in Iraq.
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Five years after the invasion, Iraq became a failed state. The war discharged a
new power struggle in the country that lasted for years, something that prevented the
government in Baghdad from performing effectively. With the country unable to
overcome the insurgency, and as violence erupted in most of Iraq, Tehran assumed an
important role in Iraqi affairs. Robert Baer contends that Iran believed that once tripped
in the Iraq turmoil, America will eventually acknowledge the ascendant Iranian role in
Iraq and the whole Middle East. Accordingly, Baer argues that Iran was using its
experience in Lebanon to replicate its success elsewhere across the whole Middle East,
repeatedly  trying to claim geopolitical and economic advantage over its rivals,
especially when it comes to oil and energy resources. In fact, Baer suggests that Tehran
clearly understood how vulnerable America is when it comes to oil. Hence, Tehran
focused its sights on securing the Iraqi oil, which, combined with their own reserves,
would mean that Iran would be able to control up to 55% of the world’s known oil
reserves. Indeed, no foreign oil company would have the right to bid on Iraqi field
exploration without consulting Tehran. Baer points out that ExxonMobil, which faced
with the bitter reality of the economic sanctions on Iran, decided not to apply for any
bids to explore the Iraqi oil fields (Baer, 2008).
Through its proxies in Iraq and its close relations with the diverse political
organizations, Tehran was able to exert overwhelming influence in Baghdad (Baer,
2008). Although it significantly grew after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Tehran’s influence
grew in the 1980s and the 1990s of the past century. During this period, many of the
Iraqi Shia leaders were seeking refuge in Iran, as they flew away from Saddam’s
oppressive regime. While it was very normal for an Islamic Shia regime to protect its
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fellow threatened leaders, Tehran had certainly more than religion in mind. In fact, the
Iranians were trying to benefit from  this situation by organizing the various Shia
political organizations and arming their military wings. Eventually, the main politically
and militarily active organizations in Iraq after 2003 were trained and armed in Tehran
during the 1990s period (Nasr, 2006).
Generally speaking, Iran worked for the formation of a pro-Iranian Shia
dominated government in Baghdad, and tried to keep America caught up in Iraq’s
internal politics. Iran's top strategic priority is to establish a friendly, preferably Shiite
government that is sufficiently powerful to impose order but not powerful enough to
pose a serious security threat to Iraq (Milani, 2009). By doing so, Tehran encouraged
elections as a way to ensure ethnic majority rule, i.e. Shia one, as well as backing and
financing diverse, even competing, Iraqi organizations  (Baer, 2008). Consequently,
Tehran positioned itself to defend its interest whatever were the political conditions.
Through its support for various Iraqi militias and organizations, including Sunni ones,
Iran’s quest to dominate Iraq was clear. Tehran was trying to ensure its supremacy both
under military conditions and under democratic scenarios.
Tehran became  a far more dominant player after 2003,  ruled by a radical
government, and seeking to exploit this new situation to expand its influence throughout
the whole region. The shocking images of the eight years Iran-Iraq war, which did halt
Iran’s pursuit for regional domination, were past and totally forgotten. By overthrowing
the Baathists, hence breaking the status quo in the Persian Gulf, America initiated the
rise of the Persian state in the region. Accordingly, the election of the conservative
AhmadiNejad as president of Iran, as well as the sudden shift in oil prices, partially
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affected by the 2003 war, allowed Tehran to benefit from the favorable opportunities
offered by the decision to invade Iraq. Iran eventually sought to fortify its coalition with
Syria, increasing its support for Hezbollah and Hamas, but also drawing suspicion from
many Arab leaders, as the term “Shia crescent” became familiar with the regional rise
of Tehran. Additionally, as part of its enduring war of ideology with America, Tehran
sought cooperation with distant states, like Venezuela, as well as supporting groups like
Taliban with whom it only share its animosity to America (Ottaway et al., 2008).
The Bush administration did not have the deterrence abilities to force a change
in Tehran's policies. At times, Iran seemed to be willing to cooperate, but on its own
terms. Washington was never in a strong position to force Tehran to follow its orders.
America was bogged down in the Iraqi turmoil and with oil prices constantly reaching
higher values, the situation could not get better for the neocons, as neither the sanctions-
which was never respected by all states - nor the military option- which seemed far
from being a realistic option- seemed to force Tehran to change its policy in the Middle
East (Ottaway et al., 2008).Iran was not the sole obstacle for US geopolitical plans in
Iraq; Syria and Saudi Arabia were also important players in this struggle.
3.3.2- Syria: a Struggle for Survival
Damascus firmly stood against the decision to invade Iraq, emphasizing the
importance of preserving the independence of the country while supporting its political
development, and later repeatedly requesting a time table for the withdrawal of U.S
forces from Iraq. During the build up to the war and while America was preparing to
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wage the war against Iraq, Damascus quickly opposed the war by hosting Iraqi officials.
Also, Syria attempted to thwart US effort to gain international support for such war, an
act that inflicted tension with Washington. American Officials accused Syria of acting
malignly in Baghdad, by transmitting into its Iraqi borders Muslim extremists in order
to fuel insurgency against U.S led troops. Not only  officials were condemning
Damascus for encouraging and supporting Arab fighters in their jihad against U.S
forces, but also Damascus was accused of arming many Iraqi organizations as well as
providing refuge for many Baathist leaders (Horan, 2003). Unsurprisingly, the Bush
administration also claimed that Syria acquired chemical weapons, an allegation
Damascus constantly denied. Similar to the Iranian case, the U.S government hoped that
regime change in Iraq and the creation of a new pro-American government would
eventually force a change a regime change in Damascus as well, or at least a change in
its political behavior in the region, namely cutting of its support for Hezbollah and
Hamas (Zisser,2007)
Critics condemned Syria for trying to manipulate anti-US sentiments in Iraq by
supporting Islamist extremist, while at the same time repressing them in its own
territories. Although Damascus denied those declarations, it acknowledged that some
fighters did cross into Iraq from its borders (Sands, 2010).Some experts argue that
Syria's support of jihadist movements in Iraq should be seen as a mix of ideological
inspiration as well as a self-defense tactic employed by the regime (Rubin, 2007). The
regime’s support of anti-US movements was mainly because Damascus wanted to
strengthen its position in the eyes of the Syrians and Arabs, as well as being threatened
by a U.S victory which could eventually harm Syria in the future. By opposing the war
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and by frequently criticizing America’s decision to invade Iraq, Damascus was
picturing itself ideologically as the head of the opposing Arab camp (Zisser,
2003). Trying to gain support of the Arab masses, Syria accused the Bush
administration of having imperial ambitions regarding their quest for Iraqi oil resources
and trying to redraw the regional map.
Syria turned a blind eye to the transfer of arms into Iraq via its borders and
allowed volunteers to cross its borders in order to fight foreign forces. As Damascus
sensed the danger of U.S victory in Iraq, it hoped that once bogged down in the Iraqi
turmoil, the Bush administration would have no other choice but to look toward
reconciliation with Damascus in order to prevent total chaos in the country.
Consequently, the regime’s behavior in Iraq after 2003 pushed the U.S administration to
embrace an unprecedented severe tone against Syria and led to the further deterioration
of the two countries’ relations. For instance, Saudi Arabia was also at the heart of the
struggle for Iraq. The next section examines Riyadh’s role in this ongoing geopolitical
battle.
3.3.3- Saudi Arabia: an Ally or Foe?
The 2003 Iraq war took place at a time when America was pressing Saudi
Arabia to cut off its links with al-Qaeda. Baer asserts that nearly all the funding of al-
Qaeda and other Islamic Jihadist groups came from sources in Riyadh (Baer, 2003). The
Bush administration aimed to cut such support and pressured the Saudi regime to
collaborate with their demands. The two countries’ close alliance depended heavily on
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oil, as Saudi Arabia was always a key to global oil stability, especially during periods of
political instability (Pelletiere, 2010). While America depended on Saudi oil to assure
global stability, the rulers of Saudi Arabia depended on U.S military protection against
any external or even internal threats.
From a Saudi geopolitical perspective, the decision to invade Iraq was a sign
that the relationship between both countries would not remain the same. Since oil
resources in Iraq were considered to constitute the only cheap alternative of the Saudi
ones, Riyadh feared that US dependency  on its oil would eventually decrease
sometimes in the future, thus undermining its geopolitical role in the Middle East
(Sykes, 2010).In fact, many neocons claimed that toppling Saddam Hussein and
installing a democratic, pro-American government in Baghdad, would mean that Iraq
would soon grow into the main energy exporter to the West, thus allowing America to
unconditionally face Riyadh in its global war on terrorism (Eland, 2002).  Hence,
reducing America and the West’s reliance on Saudi oil would eventually be one of the
most important component of the administration’s war on terrorism that erupted in the
wake of 9/11 attacks, and would eventually smooth Washington’s way toward forcing a
regime change in Riyadh as well.
Moreover, U.S military  bases in Iraq were viewed as the substitute for
America’s bases in Saudi Arabia. Similar to the oil issue, American bases in Iraq would
put the regime in Riyadh under both external and internal threats, especially with the
regional rise of Iran. Like many other Sunni Muslim regimes in the Middle East, the
Saudis were also worried that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would most likely
expand Iranian influence in the region, namely in Iraq, as Tehran did form strong ties
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with many of the exiled Shia leaders during the past two decades (Wehrey et al., 2009).
Thus, by installing new bases in Iraq, the neocons were sending a clear message to
Riyadh about the new geopolitical realities in the Gulf. Finally, and perhaps most
frightening to the Saudi ruling family, the invasion of Iraq would mean that, like the
Iranian and Syrian cases, the Bush administration was hoping that a new democratic
Iraq would lead toward reforms, even regime change, in Saudi Arabia. Baer claims that
prior to invading Iraq, many U.S officials threatened many of their Saudi counterparts
that in case they did not end their support of al-Qaeda, they will also be attacked (Baer,
2003).Thus, fearing that any American victory in Iraq would constitute a direct threat to
their regime stability, Riyadh opposed the war on Iraq, even though they initially
perceived Saddam Hussein’s regional ambitions as a direct threat to their own stability.
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the balance of power in the Persian Gulf region
shifted, negatively impacting relationships between Tehran and Riyadh (Jahner, 2012).
Saudi Arabia was reportedly financing and supporting insurgents in Iraq. Many U.S
intelligent reports mention that there had been hundreds of Saudi fighters in Iraq. Other
reports suggested that roughly 25% of non-Iraqi fighters came through Saudi Arabia
(Prados & Blanchard, 2006). By funding the Sunni movements in Iraq, the Saudis were
trying to counter the growing Iranian role in Baghdad and supporting Iraqi Sunnis in
their political struggle against their fellow Iraqi Shia(Cooper, 2007). More importantly,
by supporting the insurgency against American troops, Riyadh was trying to prevent an
American victory in Iraq which would push for reforms in the Kingdom in the future.
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3.4-Conclusion
This chapter explored U.S post-war plans in Iraq and the geopolitical struggle
that took place in the country. Always influenced by their close ties to Israel, this
chapter suggests that the neocons’ quest for reshaping the Middle East was a significant
aspect of the Bush administration’s Middle Eastern foreign policy. Ironically, Iran and
Saudi Arabia, supposedly two countries with opposing regional ambitions, had one
common goal which was to prevent U.S seizure of Iraq’ oil. Both states, alongside
Syria, fueled and supported insurgency against U.S troops. Iraq's neighboring countries
heavily interfered in its internal politics in order to counter U.S regional ambitions, as
the neocons sought to force regime changes in many of Iraq’s neighboring nations in
their attempts to reshape the Middle East. Therefore, trying to prevent a regime change
at home, Baghdad’s neighbors wanted to see America bogged down in Iraq. The next
chapter investigates US policies toward Lebanon under George W. Bush, and how the
country became the battleground for an intense geopolitical struggle between, on the
one hand, the US and Israel and, on the other, Iran and Syria.
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Chapter Four
Lebanon: Another Geopolitical Battleground
4.1-Introduction
For the past fifty years, US policy in the Middle East was governed by a number
of objectives: the quest for oil and the protection of Israel. Since its early engagements
in the region, supporting pro-American governments was pivotal. At some point, as a
response to new geopolitical conditions, shifts in US policies took place, including
cautious engagements with so-called rogue states such as Syria and Iran. Lebanon, one
of the smallest Middle Eastern countries, has always attracted international attention
disproportionate to its small size. With its relatively small size, pivotal geopolitical
location, long term sectarian tensions, and most importantly, the increasing international
involvement in its matters, Lebanon has always been a battleground for the conflicts of
others. Unsurprisingly, the French term ‘libanisation’ became officially part of the
French dictionary, referring to any process of fragmentation of a state as a result of
confrontation between diverse communities (Hirst, 2010).
Political conditions in the Middle East significantly shaped American- Lebanese
relations. For instance, various domestic factors in both countries influenced US policy
toward Beirut. However, the power of such factors in shaping US policy towards Beirut
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has been limited largely by US regional considerations that went beyond Lebanon. This
chapter investigates American foreign policy in Lebanon from 2003 through 2008.US
policies toward Beirut are  largely intertwined with American considerations at  the
regional level. In order to analyze the neocons’ policy in Lebanon and the major
challenges that took place in this country during the last decade, it is vital to consider
Washington's geopolitical struggle in the region, mainly its struggle against Syria and
Iran. During this period, the major considerations shaping American policy toward
Beirut were rarely related to Lebanon, but part of the broader geopolitical struggle in
the Middle East in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
4.2- U.S-Lebanese Relations after 9/11
Lebanon was not considered a priority to the Bush administration’s Middle East
diplomacy until the9/11 attacks, which created a new global reality for Washington.
Reacting to new realities in the Middle East, American officials put Syria and Lebanon
on the top of their political agenda. Indeed, Israel and its lobby in Washington
significantly influenced US government policy toward Damascus after 9/11. Walt and
Mearsheimer   (2007) argue that Israel, backed by the neocons in the Bush
administration, worked hard to convince the US government to treat Syria as a hostile
and dangerous enemy. Ironically, the war on terrorism launched by the neocons was
perceived as a potential point for US-Syrian cooperation. The regime in Syria complied
with post-9/11 American requests and provided the US government with intelligence
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reports on Al-Qaida’s activities against American targets(Crane, 2005). However,
Damascus refused American demands to end its military and political support for anti-
Israeli organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and did not accept to end its
alliance with Iran.
The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 deepened disagreements between the US
and Syria, which made the cooperation between both countries almost impossible. In
the aftermath of the fall of Saddam’s regime in Baghdad, officials in Tel Aviv urged the
Bush administration to pressure and threaten the regime in Syria to comply with a set of
Israeli demands. Successfully wiping out Saddam Hussein’s regional threat, Tel Aviv
tried to convince the US government that Bashar al Assad was more dangerous to
regional stability(Walt &Mearsheimer, 2007). Growing highly suspicious of US-Israeli
intentions, Damascus opposed Washington’s plans to launch a war against Iraq. Fearing
a similar invasion  in the future, Damascus was reluctant to support Washington's
invasion of Iraq.
The 2003 Iraq war exacerbated relations between Washington and Damascus.
As part of the existing geopolitical struggle with Damascus, America openly objected to
Syria’s dominance in Lebanon. On December 12, 2003, and under the “Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act”, the Bush administration
challenged Damascus’ presence in Lebanon by imposing sanctions and downgrading its
diplomatic ties with Syria. The power of AIPAC significantly shaped such decision.
According to Michael Blanford, the US congress threatened to impose sanctions on
Damascus unless it fulfilled a host of conditions that appeared to suit the security needs
of Israel rather than Lebanon’s sovereignty (Blanford, 2009). Walt and
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Mearsheimer(2007)contend that the legislation was significantly endorsed by AIPAC
and framed by some of Israel’s best friends in congress. The law was meant to pressure
Syria and end its support for Jihadist organizations, cease fuelling insurgency in Iraq,
and more significantly, end its military presence in Lebanon.
Unsurprisingly, Lebanon became a geopolitical battleground between America
and Syria. In summer 2004, as the Lebanese parliament extended the term of the Pro-
Syrian President Emile Lahoud, UN Security Council Resolution 1559 was adopted,
which called for the disarmament of non-state militias, namely Hezbollah, as well as the
immediate withdrawal of remaining security forces, in reference to Syria(Hirschfeld,
2006). As critics of the resolution argued that such demands echoed Israel’s requests,
Lebanon plunged into a heated political debate, which peaked with the brutal
assassination of Rafic Hariri.
4.2.1- The Assassination of Rafic Hariri
On February 14, 2005, former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated in
Beirut. As international accusations pointed to the Syrian role in Hariri’s murder, the
Bush administration inaugurated a new era of US policy in Lebanon. With its support
for the anti-Syrian 14 March coalition, America increased its pressure on Syria to
withdraw its forces from Lebanon and comply with international demands (Hirst, 2010).
Thus, the Bush administration was fully engaged in the battle against Syria in Lebanon.
Hariri’s murder and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon
opened a new era in US policy in Lebanon. In reaction to the assassination, Washington
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demanded the immediate withdrawal of Syria’s  security forces from Lebanon and
requested the fulfillment of UNSCR 1559. The Bush administration supported efforts to
establish a UN independent committee to investigate Hariri’s assassination, which was
used to increase the pressure on the Syrian regime (Heydemann & Sallam, 2009).
America also supported efforts to form a Special Tribunal for Lebanon to summon
those found guilty for Hariri’s murder. Washington provided 40% of the Tribunal’s first
year’s budget. Indeed, the Tribunal was a valuable tool used by the Bush administration
in its geopolitical struggle with Damascus. Nicholas Blanford argues that Washington
and Paris perceived the Hariri Tribunal as a useful mean to pressure the regime in Syria
to comply with American requests in regard to its behavior in Iraq, Lebanon and
Palestine (Blanford, 2009). Lebanon was thus meant to become the focal point of
pressure against Damascus.
Weakening Damascus was not the only objective for US policy in Lebanon.
Washington was eager to counter the Iranian influence in the Middle East, which had
dramatically grown after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.Americadealt with the
ascending power of Hezbollah as part of its geopolitical struggle with Iran. Blanford
argues that by undermining Damascus’ influence in Beirut, the Bush administration was
also keen to counter Tehran’s growing power in the region. Washington viewed the
political scene  in Lebanon as  largely exposed to external  factors, especially those
originating from Tehran, Riyadh, Damascus and Tel  Aviv (Heydemann & Sallam,
2009). Most importantly, Tel Aviv’s animosity toward Damascus and Tehran largely
influenced the Bush administration’s policy toward Iran and Syria.
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The Hariri murder unleashed severe international pressure on Damascus, most
importantly from America and France. After the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005,
U.S government supported the anti-Syria coalition in Lebanon, commonly referred to as
the March 14 coalition. Steven Heydemann and Hecham Sallam (2009) argue that US
aid to Lebanon expanded significantly after 2005. Averaging annually around $27
million per year till 2004, American economic assistance to the Lebanese government
reached $202.8 in 2007. Fitting well with US objective of countering Iranian and Syrian
influence in the Middle East, the March 14 alliance fiercely opposed Damascus and
Tehran’s growing influence in Lebanon. Most importantly, the March 14 coalition ,
backed by significant popular support, strongly supported the establishment of the
international Hariri Tribunal, which was perceived as a valuable tool to undermine the
Syrian regime.
The Bush administration’s policy toward Beirut revolved around backing the
Lebanese government against the growing influence of Syria and Iran. Struggling to
rebuild  institutions and failing  to exert total control  over its entire territories,  the
Lebanese government was faced with several critical issues. Most importantly, Found
Siniora’s government struggled to cope with the rising power and influence of
Hezbollah, which was backed by strong regional actors. The main challenges for the
Lebanese government centered on unresolved disputes alongside its borders, the rising
power of extremist groups in Lebanon, and most importantly, its inability to cope with
American demands regarding the disarmament  of Hezbollah and other Palestinian
groups. The next section examines the geopolitical struggle in Lebanon, particularly the
growing power of Hezbollah and how regional powers perceived its role.
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4.3- Hezbollah’s Geopolitical Uses for Syria and Iran
In the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration
viewed Iran and Syria’s ties to Hezbollah as a direct threat to its influence in the region.
Certainly, Syria and Iran were responsible for the growing power of Hezbollah (Hirst,
2010). Jeremy Sharp et al. (2006) argues that Iran and Syria were supporting, arming,
training, and financing Hezbollah, increasingly using the organization as a proxy to
accomplish their own goals in the Middle East. On one hand, through their primary role
in supporting Hezbollah, Tehran and Damascus held regional ambitions to rise as the
unchallenged powers in the region. On the other hand, both countries were keen to
spread their influence within Lebanon, a small but strategic country.
Supporting Hezbollah provided Syria and Iran several geopolitical benefits.
Tehran certainly benefited from such ties to counter western pressures regarding its
nuclear program (Nakhle, 2007; Rubin, 2007; Pan, 2006). Looking to deflect
international censure over its nuclear program, Tehran was keen to strengthen
Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon and use the “Hezbollah card” to force the West to
engage it in direct negotiation regarding its nuclear objectives.
As international pressure dramatically grew on it after 2004, Syria was similarly
keen to support and strengthen Hezbollah’s status in Lebanon in order to counter such
pressure. Emile el-Hokayem argues that Syria’s political gain from its alliance with
Hezbollah eventually became tangible in 2004 (2007). As UNSCR 1559 was passed,
and in the aftermath of Hariri assassination in February 2005, Damascus was subject to
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extreme international pressure to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and cut its support
to Hezbollah, an act that would undermine Syria’s geopolitical status. To counter such
Western efforts, the regime in Syria relied heavily on Hezbollah to oppose the US-led
plans, describing such efforts as illegitimate interference in both countries’ internal
affairs. Damascus’ close ties with Hezbollah, an Islamic organization with strong anti-
Israeli sentiments, became the central achievement of the regime in Syria, presenting
itself as directly responsible for Hezbollah’s successes. By fostering its ties with the
Lebanese Shiite  organization, Damascus hoped  to resist international isolation and
defend its geopolitical role as a central power in the Middle East. In other words,
similar to Tehran’s case, Damascus was eager to deflect international pressure and push
toward more Western engagement by empowering Hezbollah in Lebanon by using it as
a political tool in its negotiations with many Western countries, especially amid its
peace negotiations with Israel.
Esther Pan argues that as Syria broke away from most Arab countries and
supported Iran during its war with Iraq, Tehran supported Damascus after the February
2005 murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. The author claims that both
countries dramatically improved their relations after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In
particular, Damascus felt vulnerable and pushed toward a mutual defense pact with
Tehran, which included improving Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah. Tehran and
Damascus used Hezbollah as part of the ongoing geopolitical struggle in the Levant.
Surrounded by enemies, both countries strengthened their ties as a way to counter the
growing geopolitical power of their adversaries and to avoid a fate similar to that of the
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Baath regime in Baghdad. The next section examines how the Bush administration
perceived Hezbollah and its plans to undermine it.
4.3.1- Washington's Confrontation with Hezbollah
Hezbollah constituted one of the greatest obstacles to the neocons’ plans in
Lebanon. With the party exerting a growing influence inside the Lebanese Shia society
as well as gaining popular support throughout the Middle East following its successful
military struggle against Israel, Hezbollah became an important player in the Middle
Eastern geopolitical struggle (Wehrey et al., 2009). The movement’s close ties with
Iran, and its strategic relationship with Syria, threatened to counter US plans not only in
Lebanon, but in the broader Middle East.
American officials constantly demanded complete government control over all
of Lebanon, especially the southern part and the Palestinian camps. Officials argued that
with the absence of such control, organizations perceived as terrorist ones, namely
Hezbollah, would be able to operate freely. US support UNSCR 1559 was largely
shaped by Israeli concerns about the growing military arsenal of Hezbollah, which was
perceived as a threat to Tel Aviv. Accordingly,  US requests for the Lebanese
government to exert total control and extend the central government’s authority over its
territories were to counter Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon and as part of the wider
geopolitical struggle against both Iran and Syria.
Hezbollah always occupied a prominent position in US geopolitical plans in
Lebanon (Heydemann & Sallam, 2009). The threat of the organization was identified as
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early as 1980s after being linked with the US embassy bombing in Beirut, one of the
deadliest attacks ever directed against US diplomats. Hezbollah threatens American
interests on many scales. As a non-state actor, it is viewed by Washington as an
important barrier to the rebuilding of post-civil war Lebanon as well as preventing the
central government from exerting its total control over the country, consequently
undermining Lebanon’s security conditions. Hezbollah’s unwillingness to disarm, its
refusal to implement many UN security resolutions calling for its disarmament, and
most importantly, its growing military power, which threatened to destabilize the long-
standing status quo in favor of Israel, as seen in the June 2006 war, were all perceived
as direct threats to US geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Such perceptions did
not change even with Hezbollah’s decision to participate in Lebanese political life and
state institutions.
Hezbollah was also perceived as being part of the Iranian network in the Middle
East and was regarded as a direct threat to American interests in the region (Wehrey et
al., 2009). The Bush administration viewed Hezbollah’s Iranian ties as raising the
possibility of armed struggle between Lebanon and Israel, and such ties were used to
deter the possibility of attacks against Tehran’s nuclear programs (Hirst, 2010).
Heydemann and Sallam (2009) view such ties as the framework within which
Hezbollah has provided training and other forms of support to pro-Iranian actors in Iraq
and Palestine, and to anti-Israeli and anti-American actors more broadly (Heydemann &
Sallam, 2009). As Tehran’s influence expanded in the Middle East after the toppling of
Saddam Hussein, America perceived the growing power of Hezbollah as part of the
ascending geopolitical role of Iran. Through its support to radical, anti-US regimes and
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groups, Hezbollah was viewed as a critical threat to American interests on the regional
level, especially regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian
demonstrations that took place in Beirut in February 2005 offered the Bush
administration an ideal opportunity to counter Tehran’s growing influence in the Middle
East.
Hezbollah’s  relationship with Syria, which had been overshadowed by the
group’s ties to Iran, was regarded by the Bush administration as boosting Damascus’s
geopolitical position in the Levant, especially in its peace negotiations with Israel. Most
importantly, Damascus was always criticized for its role as the geo-strategic linchpin
connecting Iran to Hezbollah or as the intermediary between Tehran and its proxy in
Lebanon (Blanford,2009). Both the United Nations and Israel were concerned with the
fact that Tehran provided Hezbollah with high amount of rockets via Syria, calling upon
Damascus to stop such violating acts. Hezbollah’s support for anti-Israel Palestinian
groups, particularly Islamic Jihad and Hamas, was viewed as much threatening for the
same reasons. Heydemann and Sallam (2009) contend that Hezbollah was more than
willing to supply the Palestinian organizations with much needed financial, logistical,
and material support after the Israeli siege on Gaza. Hezbollah provided extensive
military training and huge financial aid to many Palestinian organizations, acting as a
role model for Hamas in particular. In fact, the two organizations shared the same
political doctrine, i.e., liberating Palestine, employed the same military tactics, and
shared close ties to Tehran (Sharp, et al., 2006).
Hezbollah was also seen by the Bush administration as a huge threat to its
efforts of supporting moderate Middle Eastern governments while at the same trying to
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isolate radicals Islamic groups. The organization’s growing popularity in the Middle
East at that time, largely shaped by its ability to spread its messages effectively via its
own media platforms, namely the television network al-Manar, did successfully counter
American efforts to undermine it (Heydemann & Sallam, 2009).Yelena Osipova
contends that Hezbollah was largely successful in its media related objectives, not only
within Lebanon but also globally, gradually attracting support and consolidating its
political status (Osipova, 2011). Certainly, Hezbollah’s prominent usage of various
communication outlets enhanced its image throughout the Islamic world. The group
acquired a growing legitimacy by carefully managing its public image in the Middle
East, effectively balancing its military, political and social activities.
Finally, the Bush administration was aware of the growing threat posed by
Hezbollah to Israel. American concerns for Tel Aviv stemmed from domestic and social
concerns, as well as from the rising power of the Israeli Lobby (AIPAC) and the
growing i6nfluence of the neoconservatives in the Bush administration (Hirst, 2010;
Walt & Mearsheimer, 2007). As Hezbollah’s power was increasing and Iran's
geopolitical power was growing, the neocons were keen to alter the status quo on the
Lebanese-Israeli borders. Since Hezbollah’s foundation in the early 1980s, the
organization’s leaders repeatedly argued about the importance of military struggle
against Israel. In fact, eliminating Israel was always one of Hezbollah’s foremost goals.
Amal Saad Ghorayeb argues that the group’s animosity toward the Jews had always
been motivated by Islam’s hostility toward Judaism, which minimizes the role of
political motivations in this struggle (2002). Indeed, the organization firmly opposes
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Israel’s existence and rejects international plans to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict
based on the recognition of Israel’s right to exist.
Washington's and Tel Aviv’s perceptions about such threat led to extensive
military agreements between both countries, trying to fend off the organization’s
growing threat. Patrick Devenny contends that Hezbollah’s threat to Israel expanded not
only in quantity, but also in quality. With the organization’s missiles arsenal growing
extensively after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and with the
introduction of new developed Iranian-made ones, American and Israeli interests in the
Middle East were threatened. Consequently Washington’s war on terror was
undermined.
Heydemann and Sallam (2009) assert that while there exists broad agreement
within the U.S. political system about the threats associated with Hezbollah, this has
been accompanied by persistent, at times intense, bargaining and competition around
specific policies to address the threat. Participants in such debates, in addition to US
officials, have been representatives of NGO’s, think tanks and even members of the
Lebanese lobby in America. Many participants have been eager to support aggressive
American plans to undermine Hezbollah, which include increasing pressure on the
organization by imposing more  damaging sanctions, or by increasing military and
economic aid to Israel. Others supported a more moderate approach, and distinguished
between Hezbollah’s political role and its military branch. Certainly, increasingly
influenced by the growing power of the neoconservatives in his administration, Bush
was keen to aggressively confront Hezbollah rather than engage in a dialogue with the
organization.
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As Hezbollah constituted a severe threat to US interests in Lebanon and the
Middle East and with the new regional balance of power created by the organization’s
ascending power, the Bush administration imposed vast sanctions on the party. America
officially included Hezbollah on its terror organization list and imposed huge financial
restrictions on the organization and its supporters. Washington also prohibited political
and diplomatic  ties with Hezbollah,  restricting American citizens from providing
material support or financial aid to the organization. Accordingly, the US government
strongly advocated plans to financially support the Lebanese central government and
backed plans to expand its authority to the areas controlled by Hezbollah. Moreover,
starting in 2006, and as part of its effort to undermine  Hezbollah, the Bush
administration granted more than half a billion dollars to Lebanon in the form of
military assistance, with more than$80 million of the amount given to the Internal
Security Forces (ISF).This matter became a debatable issue in Lebanese political life
and subject to fierce criticism by the anti-US camp in Lebanon (Kollock, 2010).
Most importantly, as part of its war on terror, the Bush administration
augmented its military assistance to Israel to unprecedented levels. Sensing the danger
on Israel’s northern border, the Pentagon delivered $10.5 billion to its ally, its biggest
military aid program and granted Tel Aviv $6.3 billion in arms deliveries (Fernandez,
2009). Indeed, as Hezbollah significantly grew powerful and as part of the geopolitical
struggle with Syria and Iran, the neocons were eager to push Israel to attack Hezbollah
and eliminate its threat (Walt &Mearsheimer, 2007). Yusuf Fernandez argues that Bush
gave Tel Aviv the green light to attack Hezbollah, which was to be the first step in a
broader campaign against Damascus and Tehran (Fernandez, 2009). Israel used
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Hezbollah’s attack against its troops, which  resulted  in the capture of two Israeli
soldiers as well as killing three others, as a pretext to initiate the 33 days war. The next
section examines this war and its geopolitical implications.
4.3.2- Goals of the July war
As stated in the previous chapter, many experts assert that the Bush
administration´s Middle Eastern policies were affected by the power of the pro-Israeli
neoconservatives in the administration (Sniegoski, 2008; Walt &Mearsheimer, 2007).
Undoubtedly, the neocons were directly responsible for the decision to invade Iraq as
the first step in a plan to reshape the Middle East as well as advance Israel’s interest and
preserve its regional hegemony. Shortly after the war, America initiated its plans toward
Lebanon and Syria. For instance, as America sunk into the Iraqi turmoil, the neocons’
plans were halted in Iraq, and Lebanon, precisely Hezbollah, became the focal point of
US foreign policy.
The 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel was initiated as Hezbollah
kidnapped two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006. Many reports suggest that plans for the
war were established long before Hezbollah’s attacks (Fernandez, 2009; Hirst, 2010;
Walt & Mersheimer, 2007). Sniegoski asserts that Israel’s onslaught on Lebanon was
not simply a response to the attacks on its troops (2008). Increasingly over the previous
six years, Tel Aviv had grown frustrated over the growing military arsenal of
Hezbollah, and watched the ever-growing flow of arms. Consequently, it urged the
Bush administration to pressure its allies in Lebanon in order to implement UNSCR
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1559, namely the disarmament of Hezbollah and other Palestinian movements.
Washington hoped that the central government in Beirut could peacefully resolve this
matter, but as this option failed, an Israeli military warfare against Hezbollah proved
impossible to avoid.
On the regional level, although the July  2006 war was fought between
Hezbollah and Israel, many foreign actors took part in the conflict, namely Syria and
Iran. Not only were the U.S and Israeli governments keen to use the armed struggle in
Lebanon as an opportunity to undermine Hezbollah, but such war was also directed
against the organization’s main regional sponsors: Iran and Syria. The July war, fought
between Hezbollah and Israel, was a struggle for geopolitical supremacy between Iran
and Syria on one side, and America and Israel on the other (Hirst, 2010; Sharp et al.,
2006; Gambill, 2007). Certainly, one of the major rationales for the July war was to
counter Syria and Iran in the ongoing geopolitical struggle in the Middle East. Hany
Nakhleh argues that the July 2006 warfare should be directly linked to the struggle for
geopolitical supremacy in the Middle East between the main regional players (Nakhle,
2007). For the regimes in Damascus and Tehran, the war was a chance to counter the
Bush administration’s plans after 2003. Both countries were eager to turn the tables on
Washington and Tel Aviv and demonstrate their ability to strike against their plans to
redesign the Middle East. Hence, Lebanon seemed fated to be a pawn in a broader
geopolitical struggle in the region, pitting the growing axis of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah
against the influence of the West, namely American and Israel (Blanford, 2009).
As Iran and Syria were extensively providing Hezbollah with weapons and
political support, the war was perceived by many Israeli officials as strategically
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critical. In particular, Tel Aviv was keen to deter and counter the growing Iranian
influence in the Middle East. Hirst argues that terminating Tehran’s nuclear programme
was the ultimate objective of Tel-Aviv, so striking Hezbollah was only the start of a
larger strike against Iran (Hirst, 2010). Unsurprisingly, countering the Iranian influence
in the region converged neatly with US and Western goal of undermining Tehran’s
growing geopolitical goal, as well as Saudi Arabia’s objective of balancing the Iranian
power in the region.
On the other hand, Hezbollah’s decision to attack Israel was influenced by its
ties to Iran and Syria. Accordingly, Jeremy Sharp argues that Tehran and Damascus
supported, armed and financed Hezbollah, using the Lebanese Shiite organization as a
proxy  to expand their geopolitical role in the Middle East (Sharp et al., 2006).
Perceiving US presence in Iraq as a direct threat to their regime stability, Tehran and
Damascus were keen to counter America’s influence in the region by supporting
Hezbollah in its struggle against Israel. Hezbollah’s attack initiated a devastating full
scale war by Israel, which demonstrated that Tel Aviv had already planned for such
warfare even before Hezbollah attacked its soldiers. In fact, even before the outbreak of
the war, Tel Aviv wanted to disarm Hezbollah and nullify its threat, eliminate its
military arsenal, and restore its hegemony over its Northern borders.
Gary Gambill argues that Israel  had a number of military,  diplomatic, and
strategic  objectives that influenced such aggressive response to Hezbollah’s attack
(Gambill, 2007). Tel- Aviv was eager to destroy and disarm Hezbollah, thus restricting
its threat. Phyllis Bennis contends that Tel Aviv aimed at establishing unchallenged and
unchallengeable military control over all of its borders, perhaps including a direct on-
63
63
the-ground occupation, to wipe out all existing or potential resistance to its domination,
and to transform the strategic map of the Middle East (2006). Sniegoski contends that
the most limited Israeli goal was to remove Hezbollah from southern Lebanon. Indeed,
by removing Hezbollah from its northern borders, Tel Aviv would protect itself from
any future attacks and would eliminate the sole force in Lebanon able to prevent its
hegemony over the entire country. In addition, Israel wanted to deploy multinational
forces which would prohibit the emergence of any other anti-Israel organization. In fact,
Washington and Tel Aviv were considering a UN proposal draft that would deploy
international troops in southern Lebanon operating under Chapter 7, thus allowing the
usage of force against Hezbollah (Bennis, 2006).
Not surprisingly, the July war was critical for many of the Bush administration’s
policy issues in the Middle East. Precisely, the neocons’ goal of strategically reshaping
the Middle East, the growing geopolitical power of Tehran, Damascus and Hezbollah
were alarming matters for officials in Washington and Tel-Aviv. The next section
investigates the link between the July 2006 war and the Bush administration’s plans for
a new Middle East.
4.3.3- The July War and the New Middle East
Bennis contends that the July War between Hezbollah and Israel, depicted as
self-defense, was a US-Israeli war for hegemony and domination. She argues that such
struggle was initiated to redraw the map of the contemporary Middle East, an
increasingly important objective for officials in Washington and Tel-Aviv (2006).
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Certainly, the fact that the Bush administration did not seek a rapid ceasefire highlights
its determination to destroy Hezbollah. Rather, America was eager to redraw the Middle
Eastern map in a way that would ensure Tel-Aviv’s hegemony (Sniegoski, 2008; Hirst,
2010; Bennis, 2006). While the invasion of Iraq was the first pillar of the neocons’
plans in the Middle East, undermining anti-Israel Islamic organizations and abolishing
their threat to Tel-Aviv was supposed to be the next step. In 2006, many of the main
architects of the Iraq war were already out of the White house, such as Paul Wolfowitz.
However, their intellectual legacy was significantly  powerful and certainly did
influence Bush’s decisions regarding Lebanon and Hezbollah. Bush  stuck with US
unilateralism, adopted a confrontational foreign policy, and wanted to benefit from the
superiority of US military (Bennis, 2006). Sniegoski argues that Tel Aviv, fully backed
by the Bush administration through political, military and financial support, was keen to
maintain a fragmented Lebanon which had long been an ultimate Israeli security
objective (Sniegoski, 2008). This objective simultaneously converged with US foreign
policy initiated after 9/11, which was aiming to redraw the Middle East in a manner that
wipes out any resistance to total US control.
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya argues that during the July War, the Bush
administration’s plans to redraw the Middle East were introduced publicly. He claims
that this war was expected to realign the whole region and thereby unleash the power of
constructive chaos (Nazemroaya, 2006). This strategy of violence and chaos in the
Middle East was employed to effectively redraw the map of the region in accordance
with US-Israeli geopolitical goals and objectives. For instance, as then U.S. Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice publicly spoke about “the birth of a new Middle East”, the war
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was perceived critical to US plans to reshape the region. Mark Levine argues that the
neo-conservatives were keen to exert their strategy of creative chaos as a tool to create
their new world order. For the neocons, this strategy of chaos was a powerful
revolutionary force that would force change in a manner that advances Washington’s
interests in the Middle East (2006). Certainly, Israel’s onslaught against Lebanon, fully
backed by the Bush administration, did further validate claims about the existence of
strategic geopolitical goals behind this war.
For instance, US colonel Ralph Peters argues that without a fundamental reform
of existing boundaries, peace would never prevail in the Middle East (Peters, 2006). He
contends that since the Middle East had always been a region that exports terrorism to
the whole world, redrawing the map of the region would certainly aid in promoting
global peace and stability. He also claims that the current Middle Eastern boundaries
will only exacerbate the situation. For instance, Peters developed a controversial map
for the Middle East, published in the June 2006 issue of the Armed Forces Journal.
Arguing that the Middle East is significantly similar to the Balkans and Central-Eastern
Europe during the build-up of the World War I, Peters reshaped and redrew the
boundaries of the Middle East from the Eastern Mediterranean shores of Lebanon and
Syria to Anatolia (Asia Minor), Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and the Iranian Plateau
(Nazemroaya, 2006). Peters’ new borders were totally based on ethnic lines between
countries. Nazemroaya argues that since mid-2006, the map has been flowing around
many strategic, official, NATO, policy and military departments. He contends that this
map was allowed to publicly appear in an attempt to build general consent and to
gradually prepare the general public for such devastating changes in the region. The
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author indicates that although it does not reflect the Pentagon’s official policy, the map
was used in a training program at NATO’s Defense College for senior military officers
(Nazemroaya, 2006).
Nazir Husain also suggests that complying with the old Israeli plans to fragment
Israel’s enemies and envisaging a new Middle East in which US hegemony would be
secured, the neo-cons were eager to redraw the map of the Middle East based on ethnic
and sectarian foundation (Husain, 2007). As the concept of the New Middle East was
subsequently declared by Rice during  the July  2006 Israeli war against Lebanon,
undermining Hezbollah and wiping it out was an ultimate need in order to force such
change in the Middle East.   The next section examines the results of the war and its
major regional implications.
4.3.4- A War Won by Both Sides
Drafted by Washington and Paris, UNSCR 1701 signaled the end of the 2006
war. Even though Tel Aviv was not able achieve most of its pre-war objectives, the
resolution was considered by many to favor Israel (Tur,  2007). Bush argued  that
Hezbollah had a fantastic propaganda machine that was spreading claims about the
organization’s victory and perceived 1701 as a strategic reserve for Hezbollah and his
regional protégés (Hirst, 2010). In fact, the resolution not only urged Hezbollah to stop
its missile attacks and release the two Israeli soldiers, it also allowed Tel-Aviv to keep
its armed forces in Lebanon until the deployment of both the Lebanese Army and
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UNIFIL troops in the area. Surprisingly, the resolution was met with a degree of relief
by Tel Aviv, Hezbollah and the central government in Beirut.
On one hand, Tel Aviv did support the resolution because it perceived it as
limiting Hezbollah’s activities through the deployment of the reinforced UNIFIL forces
and the Lebanese Army all over Lebanon’s southern borders, with no similar actions on
its own northern borders. On the other hand, Hezbollah approved the reinforcement of
the UNIFIL forces “as long as it abides with its mission” and not turn into a direct threat
on the organization. Accordingly, the Lebanese government also underlined the
importance of the UNSCR 1701, constantly pledging to abide by it. On 17 August 2006,
troops of the Lebanese army were deployed to the southern side of the Litany River.
Ironically, shortly after the war, both sides announced their victory (Walt
&Mearsheimer, 2007). Then Israeli PM Ehud Olmert quickly underlined the
achievements and success of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). He claimed that as
Hezbollah was pushed  back from Israel’s northern borders, Tel Aviv successfully
achieved its pre-war objectives. However, this was not everyone’s opinion in Israel.
Hirst argues that the U.S-Israeli victory depended on the mere adoption of 1701 and not
on any successful military accomplishment. In addition to the IDF’s failure to prevent
rocket attacks on Israel throughout the war, the war failed to nullify Hezbollah’s threat,
which was still imminent at that time. Unsurprisingly, the Winograd Commission
heavily criticized Olmert for his mismanagement and inexperience during the war. For
many,  the stunning images of the IDF being defeated by an irregular force were
catastrophic and eventually pushed toward the resignation of Israel Chief of Staff Dan
Halutz and other key commanders in 2007.
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On the other hand, Hezbollah’s popularity significantly increased in Lebanon
and in the Middle East. As Tel Aviv failed to carry out its pre-war objectives and
although the Lebanese Army and the UNIFIL forces were deployed to the southern part
of the Litany River, Hezbollah grew stronger, and the organization established itself as
one of the most powerful actors in the Middle East (Hirst, 2010; Walt &Mearsheimer,
2007). Certainly, considering Tel-Aviv’s aims of crushing the organization, Hezbollah’s
aim was to merely survive during the war. In fact, Hezbollah’s growing deterrent power
against Israel was one of the most strategic consequences of the war. However, not all
Lebanese political parties recognized Hezbollah’s victory. Shortly after the war, the
Lebanese government, namely the 14 March groups, condemned Hezbollah for its
‘adventurism’ by provoking Israel, and for being directly responsible for Lebanon’s
huge economic damages that resulted from Israel’s aggressive response. As expected,
the post-war period was characterized by the important debate regarding the
controversial July War.
The July War resulted in critical domestic and regional geopolitical
consequences. As Hezbollah’s domestic and regional popularity increased in the
aftermath of the war, domestic political tensions dramatically increased soon after the
ceasefire. Much of the cross-sectarian cooperation and union that had developed during
the war quickly faded (Wehrey et al., 2009). In fact, the war deepened the political
fracture in the country between the two camps. For instance, the Hezbollah-led
opposition tried to ensure the expansion of its share of power at the expense of the
traditional Christian and Sunni elites and pressured the Lebanese government  to
conduct a series of political reforms, calling for the formation of a national unity
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government that would rule by consensus (Norton, 2009).The March 14 camp complied
with US requests and set up the international tribunal for the Hariri assassination, which
was certainly envisaged as a political tool to put pressure on Damascus and Hezbollah.
The March 14 group, firmly backed by Washington and the West, perceived
Hezbollah’s objections to the tribunal as an attempt to protect Syria (Norton, 2009;
Hirst, 2010).
Autumn 2006 witnessed a dramatic increase in the political tension. As the 14
March coalition rejected requests to form a national unity government, it soon faced
widespread demonstrations all over  the country. Accordingly, six members of the
government, including the five Shia ministers, resigned in November 2006, rendering
the government illegitimate in the eyes of the opposition groups. Claiming that the Taif
Agreement required the representation of every major sect in the government, the
opposition questioned the legitimacy of the Siniora government and considered its
decisions null, especially those related to the International Tribune (Norton, 2007). As
Speaker Nabih Berri refused to hold a parliamentary meeting to vote on the tribunal,
and in an act that underlined its geo-political importance, the UN Security council
complied with the Lebanese government’s request and approved the tribunal in May
2007 under the terms of Chapter Seven of the Charter, which deepened further the
political rift in the country. Furthermore, as Emile Lahoud’s presidency came to an end
in November 2007, Lebanon was stuck in total political deadlock. Unsurprisingly, the
presidential election in Lebanon was also a new front line for the on-going geopolitical
struggle between the two domestic and regional camps.
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In May 2008, after 17 months of tense political crisis, the tensions reached a
peak when the Lebanese government took a series of decisions, including a decision to
shut down Hezbollah’s telecommunication network. This provocative decision could
not have been taken without the firm backing of Washington and its Arab allies (Hirst,
2010). The Lebanese government accused the organization of trying to organize
terrorist attacks, which was widely dismissed and condemned by Hezbollah. Hezbollah
perceived this decision as a declaration of war against the party and requested an
immediate reversal of the decision. Soon military clashes erupted throughout Lebanon
between Hezbollah-led opposition militants and supporters of the government, leaving
dozens of dead and wounded. The opposition was soon able to seize the battle areas and
handed them over to the Lebanese Army, which left the government with no choice but
to reserve its decision regarding Hezbollah’s telecommunication network. On May 21,
2008, rival Lebanese leaders flew to Doha to end the 18-month political that almost
drove the country into a new civil war. Referred to as the Doha Agreement, the
Lebanese opposition secured its initial demand of forming a new unity government.
After months of high political tension in the country, the Doha did improve the political
conditions in Lebanon.
Hezbollah benefited the most from the agreement. According to Christopher
Daaboul, the March 14 coalition, backed by the United States and Saudi Arabia, made a
significant concession by giving Hezbollah and its allies veto power in the government
(2008). Although the organization pledged not to utilize its weapons again domestically,
the critical question regarding Hezbollah’s weapons was expelled to the “never-never”,
clearly underscoring the rising power of the party (Hirst, 2010). The Bush
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administration was among the biggest losers. In fact, the Doha agreement and the rising
power of Hezbollah on the domestic level highlighted the emerging power of Iran and
Syria, something that underlined the significant power of both regimes in the Middle
East. Always trying to counter the growing power of its adversaries, Washington was
dealt a heavy blow with the signing of the agreement in Doha, albeit temporary
(Daaboul,2008).
4.5- Conclusion
Highly influenced by the rising power of the neoconservatives,   the
Bush administration’s policy  of non-negotiation with its adversaries in the Middle
East undermined its plans in the region. As stated early in the chapter, since 2001 US
policy toward Lebanon was shifting. Hariri’s murder initiated ripples that were to
spread across the broader Middle East (Hirst, 2010). The US government was keen to
cement the emerging geopolitical conditions in the Middle East, spawned by the
decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The Bush administration perceived the Hariri tribunal as
a valuable political tool to pressure its rival and was eager to undermine the
ascending political role of Iran and Syria. Accordingly, the July 2006 war between
Israel and Hezbollah was meant to crush Hezbollah, signaling new geopolitical
conditions in the region.
However, Washington found its Middle Eastern goals constantly undermined by
its regional rivals. The Hezbollah-led opposition stood fiercely against US plans to
pressure Damascus and the 2008 Doha agreement was just another example of the
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failure of the Bush administration to achieve its desired objectives. Accordingly,
Israel’s failure to abolish Hezbollah's threat was another blow to the neocons’ plans
inthe Levant. The next chapter assesses and concludes the findings of this research.
attacks. The neocons’ revolutionary foreign policy was intended to preserve US global
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Conclusion
US Foreign Policy under Bush:
A Critical Assessment
5.1- General Findings and Conclusion
US foreign policy  in the Middle East under George W Bush was at best
imperial. This thesis suggests that the Bush administration’s core objective was to
preserve its core interests in the Middle East: ensuring the flow of oil and advancing
Israel's hegemony. Following the9/11 attacks, US Middle East policy shifted
significantly. The administration’s policy in the wake of the attacks can only  be
explained by the quest to use 9/11 to accomplish its geopolitical goals. As a response to
the attacks, the administration aggressively confronted “rogue” states such as Iraq, Iran
and Syria. Similar to other US administrations, the Bush administration was eager to
defend its oil interests in the Middle East, and to preserve Israel’s regional security and
ensure its hegemony.
After 9/11, the neocons shaped US foreign policy in the Middle East. With their
close ties to the Likud, the group was eager to advance Israeli interests in the region.
Undoubtedly, the drastic shift in US foreign policy was directly linked to the 9/11
Baghdad had a WMDs programs and ties to al-Qaeda.
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hegemony and stabilize the post-cold war world order. Their ideology and fierce
commitment to Israel shaped America’s relations with many Middle Eastern states,
especially toward Iraq and Lebanon. The central argument of the thesis is that the main
objective of US foreign policy under the neocons was to preserve Israel’s security and
interests, secure strategic oil privileges in Iraq and spread American hegemony across
the Middle East.
This argument was unpacked using two case studies: Iraq and Lebanon. Always
influenced by the power of the neocons in the administration, Washington was keen to
secure energy supplies from Iraq as a cheaper alternative compared to the Saudi one.
The Bush administration used its military presence in Iraq and its support for the March
14 camp in Lebanon in order to counter the growing geopolitical role of its regional
enemies. The next section assesses Bush’s foreign policy in the Middle East.
5.2- Critical Assessment
The Bush administration wanted to cement the emerging geopolitical conditions
in the Middle East, initiated by the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Reshaping the Middle East
was the central objective of Bush’s foreign policy. The intense diplomatic confrontation
over the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 deprived Washington of much needed support
among many international actors, even among its traditional allies. Washington’s efforts
to overthrow the regime in Iraq lacked international legitimacy, as many of the stated
rationales for invading Baghdad were proven untrue, namely the allegations that
Bush administration’s unconditional support of Israel fueled anti-US feeling throughout
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The Bush administration’s confrontational policy against its enemies
undermined its plans in the Middle East. However, Washington’s Middle East plans
were countered by the growing geopolitical power of Iran, and to a lesser extent, Syria.
Consequently, the power of America to shape international relations was significantly
diminished under Bush. The administration’s failure to reshape the Middle East and
impose a new order was apparent. Andreas Wenger argues that America was
undisputedly the leading power in the world before George W. Bush came to power and
Bush is likely to go down in history with one of the worst foreign-policy records of all
US presidents (2008). Eight years after Bush’s election as a president, America sunk
into a deep financial crisis and saw its geopolitical role largely undermined by its
enemies in the Middle East.
The neocons’ failure to accomplish their objectives in the Middle East could be
attributed to their underestimation of the geopolitical power of their adversaries. In
particular, the ascending regional power of Tehran was a barrier to US plans in the
Middle East. In many ways, Washington's failure to carry out its pre-war objective in
Iraq signaled the rise of Iran as the most powerful regional power and symbolized the
decline of Washington as the regional hegemon. After the surprisingly rapid overthrow
of the Baathist regime, coupled with the toppling of Taliban, Tehran grew significantly
stronger and was able to consolidate its rising geopolitical status, through undermining
not only Washington, but also its traditional Arab moderate regimes in the region.
Second, I argue that the impact of the Israeli lobby in shaping the neocons’
foreign policy did nothing, but damage Washington’s legacy in the Middle East. The
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the Islamic world. While focusing on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, Washington turned a
blind eye to Tel Aviv’s nuclear arsenal. In many respects, the neocons’ ties to the Israeli
Likud weakened Washington’s efforts to  impose political reforms and reshape the
Middle East. Always pre-occupied by Israel’s security needs, the Bush administration’s
policy of non-negotiation  with its adversaries in the Middle East undermined its
position vis-à-vis its regional enemies. This thesis also suggests that AIPAC’s influence
led Washington to a disastrous war in Iraq and encouraged Tel Aviv to launch a 33 days
war against Hezbollah. However, this neither destroyed Hezbollah in Lebanon nor
weakened the opposing camp led by Iran. AIPAC thus bears significant responsibility
for the failure of US Middle Eastern policy after 9/11. Ironically, many neoconservative
figures have tried to link the Arab Spring with Bush’s plans to reshape and democratize
the Arab and Islamic world. The next section examines the impact of the Bush
administration's foreign policy on current political events in the Middle East.
5.3- The Bush Administration and the Arab Spring
Many governments and international organizations view the radical changes
occurring today in the Arab World with apprehension. The current transformations in
the Middle East represent a set of opportunities for reshaping the region and introducing
democratic reforms in many Arab countries. For instance, the Arab Spring can best be
described as an unexpected uprising of public anger throughout the Arab World. The
uprising in Tunisia triggered revolts throughout the Arab region. The old order,
characterized by authoritarianism, repressive power, lack of individual freedom, human
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rights abuse, economic mismanagement and poverty, was no longer tenable. Similar to
other important revolutions, the uprising in the Middle East was born out of many long
standing intertwined causes.
It is impossible to deny the role played by America in the unfolding of events
after the uprisings and in their outcomes. However, assuming causality between the two
is misleading (Basturk, 2012). As recent polls show, in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring, US popularity among Arab citizens was declining. Another survey carried by
the Doha Center reveals that two-third of Arabs perceive America and Israel as a threat.
Indeed, such perceptions are clear manifestations of the increasing bitterness against the
long-standing  political conditions in the Middle East. For decades, Washington’s
Middle Eastern policies consisted of backing authoritarian regimes in the Middle East,
opting for political stability over pushing for democratic alternatives. Such political
conditions were imposed and patronized by Washington to guarantee US geopolitical
supremacy and to preserve Tel Aviv’s security and hegemony, as well as supporting
regimes in oil-rich Gulf countries in order to sustain the flow of oil to the West.
Although the uprisings in the Arab world denounced the existing status quo
backed and imposed by the US and its allies, many voices praise the positive role
played by Washington in shaping the Arab Spring. The Bush administration was
identified for its role in inspiring and supporting the uprisings in the Middle East.
Levent Baştürk argues that many commentators and former US officials claim that by
making the issue of democratization in the Middle East a US national priority, Bush’s
democracy agenda planted the seeds of change in the Arab World (Basturk, 2012). Rice,
Cheney and Charles Krauthammer mentioned that the Arab Spring was a mere result of
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the Bush administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East, namely the liberation and
democratization of Iraq. In other words, Bush and his neocons inner circle are praised
for being responsible for the uprisings taking place in the Middle East.
Despite the Bush administration's rhetoric about promoting democracy and
reforms, it continued to regard many authoritarian regimes as vital guarantors for
regional stability. Moreover, in  the aftermath  of the 2005 and 2006 parliamentary
elections in Egypt and Palestine respectively, the rise of Islamic parties was met with
skepticism by the Bush administration. In fact, Washington became less enthusiastic
about its democracy objectives and increased its support for ruling regimes in these two
countries. Instead of supporting free elections, Bush supported Tel Aviv in its 2008
aggressive assault against Hamas, severely damaging the administration’s reputation
and popularity in the Middle East. Accordingly, Bush, a so-called fierce democracy
promoter, praised Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, former dictator of Tunisia, during an official
visit to the White House in 2004. Bush even welcomed Ben Ali’s so-called reforms and
support for free and competitive elections (Basturk, 2012). Ironically, during Bush’s
tenure as president, Rashed al-Ghannushi, leader of the largest party in Tunisia after the
overthrow of Ben Ali, was not even granted a US visa.
As argued  in this thesis, Washington's Middle Eastern policies have many
objectives. Preventing the rise of a regional power other than Israel, ensuring easy
access to oil, and most importantly preserving Israel’s security and advancing its
interests are the cores of US policy in the Middle East. However, the existing order was
no longer sustainable, and many rulers were overthrown, including Hosni Mubarak, a
long time US ally. Initially, Washington's democracy project was designed to reform the
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Middle East over a period of generations. In other words, the plan called for gradually
transforming the Middle East in a manner that does not undermine US interests in the
region. Although it called for reforms in many Middle Eastern countries, Washington
was always looking for unopposed access to energy resources, the movement of
military and commercial traffic through the Suez Canal, the security of regional allies
such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and cooperation on military, counter-terrorism, and
counter-proliferation issues (Hassan, 2012). Increasingly, the uprisings in  the Arab
World destabilized the status quo and threatened Washington’s geopolitical position.
When the  uprisings engulfed Cairo and  Tunis, many Western governments
assumed that democracy and political reforms will prevail in many other Arab
countries. As Islamic groups hijacked the uprisings in the Middle East, hopes for the
prevalence of democratic systems across  the Middle East subsided. Recent events
suggest that the uprisings have become part of a broader geopolitical struggle in the
Middle East, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism may lead to greater conflict.
Whether or not democratization will converge with U.S interests in the Middle East is a
debatable matter. With anti-Israel organizations coming to power throughout the Middle
East, the early signs of the Arab Spring were not encouraging  for Washington.
Certainly, such political instability is hardly the sign of successful American policy in
the region. Nevertheless, instead of opposing the will of the masses, the Obama
administration decided to  follow a  pragmatic approach. In order not to  lose more
influence in the Middle East, Washington acted in harmony with the new regional
conditions (Basturk, 2012).The Obama administration seeks to inspire and manipulate
the developments in many Arab countries in a way that does not threaten its geopolitical
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interests in the Middle East. Based on this new approach, Washington, for the first time,
is  trying to  reconcile and accommodate its  policy with the rising power of many
Islamist parties throughout the Middle East.
However, given the fundamental nature of events in many Arab countries and as
the region is significantly shifting toward a new political reality, the lack of a profound
shift in Washington’s Freedom Agenda seems quite problematic. This is not to claim
that Washington  had been pursuing stable democracy promotion programmes, but
rather that the Obama administration was lacking policy innovations. Washington’s aim
of gradually introducing reforms in the Middle East failed, and there had been no
alternative plans in place. Certainly, American foreign policy  in the Middle East
requires the introduction of a new paradigm. Yet, this is not an easy task given those
democratic openings in the Arab World create a complicated situation for Washington.
Rather than supporting authoritarian regimes and governments, Washington needs to
comply with the will of the masses, and adjust its foreign policy accordingly.
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